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SAFEGUARDING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: THE
USES AND LIMITS OF PROPHYLACTIC RULES
BRIAN K . LANDSBERG•

You shall safeguard my charge . . . . 1
See that you observe everything that I command you: you must not add anything to it, nor take anything away from it.2

I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Issue Posed by Prophylactic Rules in Constitutional Law
These two biblical commandments frame the modem issue ofprophylactic
rules. May the Supreme Court, the institution charged by the Constitution with
enforcing core rules,3 protect against the violation of constitutional rights by
adopting measures designed to minimize the risk ofsuch violations, even when
those measures are not specifically authorized by the Constitution? Or will the
adoption of such prophylactic rules in fact subvert the Constitution by unduly
enlarging the powers of the rule enforcer?
The Supreme Court has adopted prophylactic rules to safeguard rights such
as the freedom of speech under the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment
right to be free from compulsion to testify against oneself, and the right to be
free from racial discrimination. Scholars have debated the legitimacy ofthese
decisions. In at least one instance, Congress has legislatively attempted to
repeal a judicially fashioned prophylactic rule. 4 Congress may not legislatively
repeal constitutionally protected rights, butthe legislature may have the power

• Professor of Law, University ofthe Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. A.B., LL.B.,
University of California, Berkeley. Alan Brownstein, Leslie Jacobs, Dorothy Landsberg,
Myron Moskovitz, George Thomas, and Michael Vitiello provided helpful comments on earlier
drafts. A summer research grant from McGeorge School of Law supported my work on this
article.
I. Leviticus 18:30 (Tanach, Mesorah Publ. 1996). This verse "is understood to require
legal authorities to insure adherence to the laws by instituting preventive safeguards." Samuel
J. Levine, Jewish Legal Theory and American Constitutional Theory: Some Comparisons and
Contrasts, 24 HASTINGSCONST. L.Q. 441 , 450 n.50 (1997) (citing TALMUDBAVLI, Yevanoth
21a).
2. Deuteronomy 12:32 (New English Bible 1970). In Jewish Bibles, this verse is
placed at Deuteronomy 13: I (Torah).
3. Congress, the courts, the executive, and the states all play roles in enforcing
constitutional rights. This article primarily addresses the role of the courts.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 350 I ( 1994) (purporting to supersede Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S . 436
( 1966), in federal prosecutions).
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to alter prophylactic rules, which play a narrower role than core constitutional
rules. Therefore, it is important to understand the difference, if any exists,
between prophylactic rules and core constitutional rules. Attacks on judicially
adopted prophylactic rules suggest that the Constitution does not authorize
them, that they resemble legislation more than judicial doctrine, and that they
displace state authority. Only a clear articulation of principles to guide the
Court in formulating and adopting prophylactic rules can answer these
criticisms.
In this article I survey case law and constitutional scholarship5 in an effort
to answer three questions. First, are the federal courts empowered to fashion
prophylactic rules? Ifso, what principles, if any, constrain the exercise ofthat
power? Finally, may Congress or the states modify or rescind judicially
fashioned prophylactic rules?
My review of the case law reveals a long history of judicial creation of
prophylactic rules, but a lack of self-conscious judicial examination of their
legitimacy. The scholarship concentrates primarily on the judicial power to
fashion prophylactic rules, with much ofthe debate centering on whether such
rules are legitimate manifestations of constitutional common law. This is an old
issue that the Talmud addressed many centuries ago. I believe the Talmudic
sources help show the way to understand the basis for prophylactic rules.
These rules inhere in the nature of any constitutive document designed to
advance normative values. And they inhere in the function of courts.
Once one understands the bases for prophylactic rules, it becomes possible
to define the boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate judicial
prophylactic action. Necessity is the basis for fashioning a prophylactic rule.
However, a court should base the content of the rule on a balancing that takes
into account not only necessity, but also federalism, the separation of powers,
and three predictive difficulties: predicting the need for the rule, its efficacy, and
its unintended consequences. Finally, Congress and the states have some
leeway in modifying prophylactic rules, so long as the modification effectively
safeguards constitutional rights. Congress may also review the factual
predicate ofthe finding ofnecessity and, upon a sufficient showing, substitute
legislative fact-finding for that of the Court.

B. Terminology
I use the term "prophylactic rules" to refer to those risk-avoidance rules
that are not directly sanctioned or required by the Constitution, but that are
adopted to ensure that the government follows constitutionally sanctioned or
required rules. 6 They are directed against the risk of noncompliance with a

5. I also briefly review a few Talmudic sources and draw some parallels between the
enforcement of Biblical and constitutional commands.
6. This is in accord with the terminology in DAVID E. ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL
FEDERALISM IN A NUTSHELL 234 (2d ed. 1987). See also Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules
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constitutional norm. To paraphrase the Talmud, prophylactic rules build a
fence around the Constitution. 7 For example, in City ofRome v. United States, 8
the Supreme Court upheld the application of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
of 19659 to disapprove seemingly nondiscriminatory practices of a
municipality. 10 Although the municipality's voting practices were held nondiscriminatory, the Court upheld this application ofthe statute because section
5 reasonably addressed the risk of discrimination. Conversely, some of the
cases in which the Court has stricken affirmative action plans have referred to
the risk of their misuse or the risk that they would stigmatize some groups.
The Supreme Court has used the term "prophylactic" to apply to a broader
spectrum of cases and as a synonym for a term the Court seldom uses:
"instrumental." Indeed, Justice Stevens has written: "It is important to
remember ... that all rules of law are prophylactic. Speed limits are an
example; they are designed to prevent accidents. " 11 The Court has called rules
prophylactic when their mission was to prevent specitic behavior and the rule
encompassed "more than the core activity prohibited." 12 Used in that sense,
prophylactic rules do not necessarily protect constitutional norms, and may
even operate to impinge on constitutional rights. For example, in the free
speech arena, the Court has said that "[b]road prophylactic rules in the area of
free expression are suspect. Precision ofregulation must be the touchstone." 13
The primary issue at the federal level is the power ofa branch ofthe federal
government to impose prophylactic rules. This power issue does not exist at the
state level. The states have plenary power over matters not delegated to the

in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article Ill Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 100, lOS
( 1985) [hereinafter Grano, Prophylactic Rules] (defining "prophylactic constitutional rule" as
"a rule that functions as a preventive safeguard to insure that constitutional violations will not
occur"). Such measures have also been called '"preventive' remedial," but that phrase seems
too limited because it sounds like ordinary preventive relief, aimed directly at the core
violation rather than at risk. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156,215 (1980)
(Rehnquist, 1.• dissenting) (criticizing this approach).
The term "prophylactic" has its origins in the Greek word, prophylaktos, meaning "to keep
guard before." 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 644 (2d ed. 1989).
7. See infra notes 189-207 and accompanying text.
8. 446 u.s. 156 (1980).
Q. Section 5 forbids jurisdictions covered under § 4 of the Act to change voting
practices until they have convinced either the Attorney General or the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia that the proposed practice does not have the purpose and
will not have the effect of discriminating in voting based on race. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
10. City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 187.
II. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 368-69 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
12. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642,646 (1997).
13. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,438 (1963) (citations omitted); see also Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding that the Communications Decency Act, which prohibits
the knowing transmission to minors of "indecent" or certain "patently offensive"
communications, abridges free speech protected by the First Amendment).
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United States or prohibited to the states, 14 so the constitutionality of state
legislation directed at risk does not depend on any federally enumerated power.
However, risk may become a factor in a constitutional challenge to state
deprivations of individual rights. For example, Wisconsin unsuccessfully
sought to justify an exception to the normal Fourth Amendment "knock and
announce" rule as protecting against the risk to police officers in executing
felony drug search warrants. 15
Defining "prophylactic" to encompass all risk-avoidance rules sweeps so
broadly as to drain the term of useful meaning. It is more helpful to conceive
of prophylactic rules as a subset of risk-avoidance rules. I therefore suggest
that only rights-protective risk-avoidance rules be called "prophylactic rules."
Other kinds of risk-avoidance rules, such as tort rules or rules protecting
against risk to the government, may raise issues similar to those raised by
prophylactic rules. However, where a risk-avoidance rule impinges on
individual rights, it is the antithesis of a prophylactic rule designed to protect
individual rights.
My term~nology avoids labeling as prophylactic those rules which are
simply overinclusive means to achieving legitimate ends. For example, in City
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 16 the Supreme Court characterized an
ordinance prohibiting distribution ofhandbills as an overreaching prophylactic
rule, although the city attempted to justify the ordinance as a protection against
littering. The Court said that the ordinance "could have addressed the
substantive evil without prohibiting expressive activity. " 17 The ordinance is not
prophylactic because it is not aimed at achieving compliance with the
constitutional norm.
My definition also excludes rules that are logical extensions of the core
rules. For example, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board ofEducation, 18
the Court held that school districts that had operated racially dual school
systems in violation of the equal protection clause were charged with an
affirmative obligation to abolish the dual system and eradicate its effects. 19
While other aspects of Swann reflected prophylactic concerns, 20 this remedial
principle is simply a logical outgrowth ofthe core ban on racial discrimination.
The rule holds that the effects of past discrimination are themselves
discriminatory.
Prophylactic rules differ from rules of deterrence. Rules of deterrence are
direct correlatives of the underlying behavior that we seek to prevent. The

14.
15.
16.
17.
involved
18.
19.
20.

U.S. CONST. amend. X.
Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395 (1997).
466 u.s. 789 (1984).
/d. at 81 0 (distinguishing the overreaching "prophylactic rule" of the ordinance
in Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)).
402 U.S. I (1971)
!d. at 2-4.
See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
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threat of punishment for a crime is thought to have a deterrent effect. The
creation ofa crime, such as prohibiting sales ofguns to former felons, may also
stern from a risk-avoidance reason, namely to lessen the likelihood of violent
use of guns.
Similarly, risk may be an element of the constitutional rule itself, as in an
early case deciding that a police officer does not offend the Fourth Amendment
when, in the course of a traffic stop, the officer orders passengers to exit the
vehicle. 21 The Court held that "the inordinate risk confronting an officer as he
approaches a person seated in an automobile" made it permissible for the state
to follow a policy ofroutinely ordering drivers out oftheir cars whenever they
were stopped for a traffic violation.22
No bright line exists between prophylactic rules and risk as an element of
core constitutional rules. When Miranda v. Arizona23 was first decided, it was
unclear which kind ofrule it was. Only later did the Court identify the Miranda
holding as a prophylactic rule. 24 The Court has not clearly placed the
application of strict scrutiny to race-based affirmative action into either
category. This constitutional or prophylactic rule is based at least in part on
contested legislative facts, such as the risk that affirmative action would have a
stigmatic effect. Indeed, heightened scrutiny of suspect classifications
is generally risk-based. For example, the Court subjects sex-based
classifications to heightened scrutiny because "of the real danger that
government policies that professedly are based on reasonable considerations in
fact may be reflective of'archaic and overbroad' generalizations about gender,
or based on 'outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females in the
horne rather than in the "marketplace and world of ideas.""'25
Both prophylactic and risk-avoidance rules are designed to correct for the
ineffectiveness of more direct prohibitions. That ineffectiveness stems in
part from the human tendency to stretch compliance with core rules and in part
from the difficulties of detecting and punishing violations of many core rules.
The authors of the Constitution knew that "[s]ome degree of abuse is
inseparable from the proper use of every thing. "26 People tend to take
advantage of ambiguity, the difficulty of detecting a violation of the law, or
weakness ofenforcement. A voidance, evasion, and clear violation ofrules are

21. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
22. Jd. at 110. However, the Court has discounted the risk that the police might take
undue advantage of the Mimms rule. See Whren v. United States. 517 U.S. 806, 8 16-17
(1996).
23. 384 u.s. 436 (1966).
24. See Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 53 (1973)("[T]he prophylactic rules in Pearce
and Miranda are similar in that each was designed to preserve the integrity of a phase of the
criminal process.").
25. J.E.B.v.Aiabamaexre/. T.B.,511 U.S.I27, 135(1994)(citationsomitted).
26. James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ONTHE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 571 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1876), quoted in New York T imes
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964).
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all commonplace. This is as true of governmental actors as ofprivate citizens,
especially where the actor is not personally committed to the core rules.
A classic risk-avoidance case is the Prohibition-era decision upholding
Congress's power to prohibit physicians from prescribing intoxicating malt
liquors for medicinal purposes. 27 The statute at issue responded to the risk that
physicians might prescribe such liquors for beverage purposes banned by the
Eighteenth Amendment. 28 The risks to which these rules respond vary in kind
and in degree. Some rules are based on concrete proof of past experience and
future threat. Others rely on prophecies that we derive from a generalized
understanding of human nature.
Because the principles relating to prophylactic rules, rules of deterrence,
and nonprophylactic risk-avoidance rules may overlap, I have not confined the
discussion that follows to pure prophylactic rules. However, the three kinds of
rules are not identical. Some principles may support one type of rule and not
the others. Therefore, I have maintained the terminological distinctions between
the judicially fashioned prophylactic rules that are the primary topic of this
article and their cousins, rules ofdeterrence and nonprophylactic risk-avoidance
rules.

C. The Issue Restated
Prophylactic rules may be attractive for several reasons. They may provide
a maximal remedy in cases where simple prohibitory rules are likely to fail.
Some prophylactic rules may be less intrusive than alternative remedies, such
as heavy damage awards. They may prove the most effective means to
achieving ends within the enumerated powers of the legislative branch. They
may simplify enforcement. At the very least, they provide another mechanism
for enforcing constitutional values. For all these reasons, prophylactic rules
have become increasingly popular with the judicial and legislative branches.
However, one may also catalog disadvantages and dangers ofprophylactic
rules. They are potentially open-ended, conferring vast discretion on courts and
legislatures. They may facilitate governmental expansion well beyond
enumerated powers. While they may be justified as a means to achieve an

27. James Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545 (1924)(upholding a law forbidding
physicians to prescribe intoxicating malt liquors for medicinal purposes.) The Court did not
rely on the Commerce Clause to uphold the statute, but upon the Eighteenth Amendment,
which prohibited the sale of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes but did not prohibit
their sale for medicinal purposes. /d. at 558. The Court applied an ends-means test to uphold
the legislation. /d. at 559 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)).
The Court noted the difficulties in enforcing prohibition and the risk that medical uses of
liquor could "open[ ) many doors to clandestine traffic," concluding that it "cannot say that
prohibiting traffic in intoxicating malt liquors for medicinal purposes has no real or substantial
relation to the enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment, and is not adapted to accomplish
that end and make the constitutional prohibition effective." /d. at 632-33.
28. /d. at 561.
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enumerated end, they may in fact be adopted to achieve a nonenumerated end.29
Their origin as prophylactic rules may be forgotten, so that they become
regarded as core constitutional rules. Indeed, recognition of the two
categories-<:ore constitutional rules and prophylactic measures-<:reates
difficult issues of categorization. Moreover, prophylactic measures may be
used to intrude on rights protected by the Constitution, to upset the balance of
power between federal and state governments, or to disrupt the balance between
the judicial and legislative branches. Thus, in the name of enforcing the
Constitution, unlimited authorization of prophylactic rules could destroy the
structure of rights and powers created by the Constitution.
Without prophylactic rules, we face undercompliance with the law. With
them, we run the danger ofrigid compliance efforts that ignore the values ofthe
underlying rule and tread on other important values. One response to this
dilemma would apply a cost-benefit analysis to the question ofwhether to risk
undercompliance or overenforcement. Another approach would seek to develop
principles that would enable us to enjoy the benefits ofprophylactic rules while
avoiding their dangers. The Supreme Court has neither engaged in the costbenefit analysis nor attempted to develop balancing principles. Instead, the
Court has imposed, approved, or rejected prophylactic measures on a case-bycase basis without analysis of their underlying foundations.
II. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF PROPHYLACTIC RULES

A. Early Examples
Prophylactic reasoning in fashioning constitutional rules had its modern
beginning in 1938, with footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products,
Inc. 30 However, more than thirty years earlier in Lochner v. New York,31 the
Supreme Court had arguably engaged in prophylactic scrutiny of state
legislation that impinged on individual autonomy. The Lochner Court referred
to "the fact that many of the laws of this character, while passed under what is
claimed to be the police power for the purpose of protecting the public health
or welfare, are, in reality, passed from other motives." 32 Therefore, the Court
relied on the effect, rather than the stated purpose of the statute, to decide
whether the statute was constitutional. The risk of duplicity, the Lochner Court
reasoned, warranted close review of statutes that impinged on individual
autonomy. 33 Along with this close review, the Court also adopted social theory

29.
become
(1981 ).
30.
31.
32.
33.

In the words ofthen-Justice Rehnquist, levels ofjudicial scrutiny "may all too readily
facile abstractions used to justify a result." Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 ( 1938); see also infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
198 u.s. 45 (1905).
ld. at 64.
ld.
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as a constitutional principle, holding that "the real object and purpose" of the
statute under review ..were simply to regulate the hours of labor between the
master and his employees," a purpose the Court held violated the Constitution. 34
However, in 1938, the Court held in Carolene Products that legislation
should be upheld as constitutional ifsome rational basis can be found to uphold
it.35 In footnote four, the Court suggested an exception to this general rule.
More searching scrutiny might apply to laws that "restrict[] those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal ofundesirable
legislation" or that the government directs at particular religious or racial
groups for whom "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities. "36 It was
thus the risk of a breakdown in the political process that the Court thought
warranted strict scrutiny. This suggests that the Court has located strict
scrutiny on the border between core constitutional rules and prophylactic rules.
Strict scrutiny is simply a test for unjustified deprivations of free expression,
equal protection, or fundamental due process rights.37 The Court has based
strict scrutiny on the importance of the right and on the risk of unwarranted
deprivation. While the test's prophylactic characteristics suggest that it is not
the right itself, strict scrutiny has become embedded in our consciousness as a
core constitutional rule.
The main holding ofCarolene Products represented a rejection ofthe prior
reign of Lochner-type prophylactic rules that led to judicial activism.
Arguably, the holding calls into doubt the legitimacy of judicially-drawn
prophylactic rules like those in footnote four. Nonetheless, later Courts
fastened onto the footnote four reasoning and not the main holding as they
fashioned prophylactic rules.

B. The Warren and Burger Courts
Prophylactic measures-court-fashioned rules, injunctions, and federal
legislation-were widely applied by the Warren and Burger Courts. Those
Courts created prophylactic rules· in cases like Miranda, 38 New York Times v.
Sullivan, 39 and Swann. 40 They approved prophylactic injunctions in school
34. /d.
35. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152.
36. ld at n.4.
37. "[The level of scrutiny strategy] is designed to identify types of legislation that by
their nature involve either so high a risk of invidious discrimination that invidiousness should
be nearly irrevocably presumed or so low a risk that its possibility should be nearly irrevocably
dismissed." Ronald Dworkin, Is Affirmative Action Doomed?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 5,
1998, at 56, 57.
38. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
39. 376 u.s. 254 (1964).
40. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 402 U.S. I (1971).
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desegregation, prisoner rights, and fair employment cases.41 These Courts also
upheld federal prophylactic legislation in the trilogy of cases that upheld
prophylactic provisions ofthe Voting Rights Act of 1965: South Carolina v.
Katzenbach,42 Katzenbach v. Morgan,43 and City ofRome v. United States. 44
I. Court-Fashioned Prophylactic Rules of General Application
a. Miranda v. Arizona
Despite their ubiquity,45 prophylactic rules attracted little scholarly
attention until the Court decided Miranda. The Miranda Court held: "[T]he
prosecution may not use statements ... stemming from custodial interrogation
of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." 46 The Court then
spelled out the minimally acceptable safeguards.47 The Court relied on prior
judicial opinions and reports ofgovernment agencies to conclude that"[u ]nless
a proper limitation upon custodial interrogation is achieved- such as these
decisions will advance-there can be no assurance that [coercive custodial)
practices ... will be eradicated in the foreseeable future. " 48 Thus, even though
"we might not find the defendants' statements to have been involuntary in
traditional terms,'>49 the Court reversed petitioners' convictions because the
interrogation had not followed minimally acceptable safeguards. 50 After
surveying recommendations for the interrogation of suspects in various police
manuals, the Court determined: "From the foregoing, we can readily perceive
an intimate connection between the privilege against self-incrimination and
police custodial questioning."51 The Court acknowledged that "we cannot say
that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular solution
for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process as it is presently
conducted," and invited Congress and the states to devise effective protections. 52
The Miranda Court did not simply explain the problem and then impose the

41. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978)(prisoner rights); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405( 1975) (fair employment); United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of
Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969) (school desegregation).
42. 383 u.s. 301 (1966).
43. 384 u.s. 641 (1966).
44. 446 u.s. 156 (1980).
45. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity ofProphylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REv.
190 ( 1988) [hereinafter Strauss, Ubiquity].
46. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
47. /d. at 444-45.
48. /d. at 447.
49. !d. at 457.
50. /d. at 499.
51. /d. at 458.
52. !d. at 467.
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rule. Rather, it explained at length the reasons underlying each element of the
rule, by reference to the specific evils each element addressed.53 The Court also
relied on the experience ofthe Federal Bureau oflnvestigation and ofpolice in
other countries as evidence that Miranda warnings would not unduly interfere
with law enforcement. 54 The opinion took as a given that the Court legitimately
could fashion a rule that might foreclose some constitutionally permissible
interrogations in order to ensure against those that were unconstitutional. The
Court therefore did not discuss the issue of the legitimacy of judicially
fashioned prophylactic rules of general applicability. The case was initially
viewed, and some continue to view it, as stating not just a prophylactic rule
designed to assure compliance with the Constitution, but a rule ofconstitutional
law. 55 However, the Court has since characterized the rule as one which
"sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself,"56 noting that "in the
individual case, Miranda's preventive medicine provides a remedy even to the
defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm. " 57
When the Court first described Miranda as nonconstitutional in Michigan
v. Tucker, 58 Justice Rehnquist wrote an opinion that "deprived Miranda of a
constitutional basis but did not explain what other basis for it there might be. " 59
Justice Douglas's dissent complained: "The Court is not free to prescribe
preferred modes of interrogation absent a constitutional basis. " 60
b. New York Times v. Sullivan

The Court has not explicitly characterized the rule of New York Times v.
Sullivan as prophylactic, but the reasoning of the case and subsequent
applications of its rule at least imply that false publications do not fall within
the core protections ofthe First Amendment. 61 Rather, it is necessary to protect

53. /d. at 467-77.
54. /d. at 483-90.
55. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 315 (2d
ed. 1992); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Bashing Miranda Is Unjustified-and Harmfol, 20 HARV.
J. L. & Pus. PoL'Y 347. 347 (1997) ("[T]he Miranda protections are required by the Fifth
Amendment.").
56. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,306 (1985).
57. !d. at 307.
58. 417 u.s. 433 (1974).
59. Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SUP. CT. REv.
99, 123.
60. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 462 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
61. 376 U.S. 254 ( 1964). The Court went on to state:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice"-that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
!d. at 279-80.
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them in order to avoid ''the pall of fear and timidity imposed upon those who
would give voice to public criticism" that would be the result ofpunishment for
mistaken but non malicious publications about public figures.62 After observing
that the "Court ... set out to craft doctrine that would ensure 'breathing space'
for First Amendment freedoms," Richard H. Fallon, Jr.listed a host ofdelicate
predictive factual determinations the Court must make in order to achieve the
proper balance. 63
Professor Fallon's description seems accurate, but submerges some
important questions. Does the Court have the tools to make such predictive
judgments? What is to be the fate of doctrine when those judgments change?
May the state adopt some alternative means of ensuring that defamation law
does not unduly chill speech directed at public officials?64 In any event, the
case demonstrates that the line between prophylactic and core protections is not
always sharply drawn.

c. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education
In Swann, the Court combined reparative and prophylactic principles when
it said:
[I]n a system with a history of segregation the need for remedial criteria of
sufficient specificity to assure a school authority's compliance with its
constitutional duty warrants a presumption against schools that are
substantially disproportionate in their racial composition.65

The Court based this presumption on the history of resistance to compliance
with Brown v. Board of Education66 (Brown !/) in states that had required

62. !d. at 278.
63. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, Ill HARV. L. REv.
54, 63 (1997). Fallon noted:
As thus conceived, the Court's task was not only to balance, in an abstract way, the First
Amendment interest in promoting the free flow of critical comment against the states'
interest in protecting reputations. The Court also had to make more concrete, empirical,
and predictive assessments about the relative proclivity of the press to engage in selfcensorship under alternative liability regimes; about the proportion of truthful and
untruthful asssertions that would be chilled by such regimes; about the harms that would
be done by false speech and the benefits of truthful speech that would be forgone under
various imaginable rules; and about the practical competence of the courts to administer
particular liability standards fairly.
/d.
64. See Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 782 (1986).
65. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 402 U.S. I, 26 (1971).
66. 349 u.s. 294 (1955).
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racial segregation ofpublic schools.67 The presumption is prophylactic because
it is based on the risk-amply supported by past experience-that school
authorities would continue to manipulate policies to maximize racial separation.
It is also reparative because it serves "to counteract the continuing effects of
past school segregation resulting from discriminatory location of school sites
or distortion of school size in order to achieve or maintain an artificial racial
separation. "68
2. Injunctions
The Warren-Burger era also saw the rise of the prophylactic injunction as
a tool to ensure against deprivations ofconstitutional rights. All injunctions are
aimed at risk, but early injunctions simply forbade conduct that would invade
the core right. 69 Prophylactic commands became a central feature ofwhat
some came to call the structural injunction. 70 The lower courts have been
accorded a high degree of discretion in designing injunctions to remedy
structural violations of the Constitution, such as systemic segregation of the
public schools and systemic imposition of cruel and unusual punishment in
prisons. Such decrees typically combine reparative measures with prophylactic
ones.
The reparative notion is firmly grounded in the Constitution and in
Marbury v. Madison/ 1 which insists that there must be a remedy for
constitutional wrongs. 72 The prophylactic injunction is grounded in equity,
which the Supreme Court noted "has been characterized by a practical
flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling
public and private needs."73 The prophylactic injunctions came to include
reporting and record-keeping provisions/4 special masters/5 and affirmative

67. Swann, 402 U.S. at 13.
68. /d. at 28.
69. See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED
IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA §§ 924-33 (3d ed. 1843), quoted in OWEN M. FISS & DOUGLAS
RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 73-76 (2d ed. 1984).
70. See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976); Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L.
REv. I (1979) [hereinafter Fiss, The Forms ofJustice].
71. 5 U.S. (l Cranch) 137 (1803).
72. /d. at 163.
73. Brown v. Board ofEduc., 349 U.S. 294,300 (1955).
74. See, e.g. , Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1965) (upholding
reporting requirement adopted "in order that the court might be informed as to whether the old
discriminatory practices really had been abandoned in good faith").
75. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir.), amended in part and vacated in
part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding thatthe appointment of special masters was proper
to supervise compliance of the Texas Department of Corrections with a court order to abolish
unconstitutional conditions of confinement).
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action programs,76 all without any claim that such provtswns were
constitutionally required. Rather, the claim was that some remedy was required
and the remedy imposed properly balanced the competing interests in the case.
The Supreme Court approved a prophylactic injunction, for example, in
Hutto v. Finney. 11 A federal district court had entered sweeping relief against
the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment on inmates of Arkansas
prisons. 78 The state challenged two aspects of that relief: a thirty day cap on
confinement in punitive isolation and an award of attorney's fees to the
plaintiffs.79 The Constitution places no particular temporal cap on punitive
isolation, nor does it provide for attorney's fees. Nonetheless, the Court upheld
both provisions as prophylactic measures, holding that "taking the long and
unhappy history ofthe litigation into account, the court was justified in entering
a comprehensive order to insure against the risk of inadequate compliance." 80
The cap on days in isolation served as "a mechanical-and therefore an easily
enforced-method of minimizing overcrowding."81 Justice Rehnquist,
dissenting, protested that the cap was "a prophylactic rule" and "not remedial
in the sense that it ' restore[s] the victims of discriminatory conduct to the
position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct. "'82
Rehnquist argued thatthe rule went further than was necessary to eliminate the
consequences ofthe past violations. 83 The district court designed the attorney's
fee award to deter the defendants from future violations of the Eighth
Amendment,84 and the Supreme Court saw "no reason to distinguish this award
from any other penalty imposed to enforce a prospective injunction."85 The two

76. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 170-71 (1987) (Brennan, J.)
(stating that past resistance to compliance with coun orders justified injunctive relief).
77. 437 u.s. 678 (1978).
78. /d. at 680.
79. /d.
80. /d. at 687.
81. /d. at 688 n.ll.
82. /d. at 712 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)(citing Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746
(1974)).
83. The authors of a recent study of prison reform litigation observe:
In one sense, Justice Rehnquist was correct in Hutto v. Finney when he dissented on the
ground that [United States District] Judge Henley's bureaucratizing remedy went beyond
the limits of the rights that the Constitution specified. But in a deeper sense, Rehnquist
was less sincere than Henley. It was clear to Henley, as it must have been to Rehnquist,
that the old regime in Arkansas could not possibly recognize the rights of prisoners, that
any judicial decision granting rights would be nothing more than markings on a piece of
paper unless it was accompanied by major structural reform.
MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN
STATE 281 (1998).
84. Hullo, 437 U.S. at 685.
85. /d. at 691-92.

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

938

[Vol. 66:925

remedies were imposed only after a lengthy history of official intransigence. 86
3. Prophylactic Legislation
Finally, the Warren and Burger courts recognized broad congressional
power to enact prophylactic legislation under the enforcement clauses of the
Reconstruction Amendments to the Constitution. David E. Engdahl has pointed
out that Congress's power under the enforcement clauses is both similar to and
different from its power under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 87 The
difference is "that the enforcement clauses deal with effectuating rights . ..
while the necessary and proEer clause deals with effectuating the federal
government's power to act." 8 The two clauses are similar in authorizing
Congress to enact legislation so long as it bears a "telic relation" (i.e., an endsmeans relation) "to some end the reviewing judiciary considers within the
substantive scope of the relevant amendment. " 89 Engdahl concludes that the
enforcement clauses
enable Congress (I) to outlaw practices, themselves not unconstitutional, as
a means to eliminate or prevent practices which are, or (2) to impose
requirements which it otherwise would lack power to impose, so long as
they are imposed as means to implement the substantive provisions of one
of these amendments.90

In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 91 the Court upheld prophylactic
provisions ofthe Voting Rights Act of 1965. The Court noted the existence of
overwhelming evidence that "case-by-case litigation was inadequate to combat
widespread and persistent discrimination in voting, because of the inordinate
amount of time and energy required to overcome the obstructionist tactics
invariably encountered" in litigation under earlier civil rights acts.92 The Court
ruled that "[a]fter enduring nearly a century of systematic resistance to the
Fifteenth Amendment, Congress might well decide to shift the advantage oftime
and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims."93
The Court then turned to the question of "whether the specific remedies
prescribed in the Act were an appropriate means of combatting the evil. " 94 In
short, the issue was not whether the Constitution prescribed the remedial shift
of the advantage of time and inertia; it did not. Rather, the Court followed the

86. /d. at 683.
87. ENGDAHL, supra note 6, at 234.
88. /d.
89. /d. at 235.
90. /d. at 236.
301 (1966).
91. 383
92. /d. at 328.
93. /d.
94. /d.

u.s.
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ends-means analysis of McCulloch v. Maryiand. 95 One might characterize
some of the Act's provisions-the suspension of tests or devices as
prerequisites for voting in covered jurisdictions, for example-as reparative
rather than prophylactic. However, section 5 of the Act, requiring preclearance of changes in voting laws in covered jurisdictions, was based on
Congress's knowledge that "some covered Uurisdictions) had resorted to the
extraordinary stratagem of contriving new rules of various kinds for the sole
purpose of perpetuating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal
court decrees. " 96 Therefore, "Congress had reason to suppose that theseS tates
might try similar maneuvers in the future in order to evade the remedies for
voting discrimination contained in the Act itself. " 97 The Court applied similar
reasoning to uphold the Act's authorization of the appointment of federal
examiners to list qualified applicants who are thereafter entitled to vote.98
C. Transition to the Rehnquist Court

Case law in more recent terms has continued to uphold prophylactic rules,
injunctions, and statutes. In Batson v. Kentucky, 99 the Burger Court ruled,
contrary to Swain v. Alabama, 100 that a defendant could raise an equal
protection challenge to the racially discriminatory use ofperemptory challenges
to exclude jurors ofthe defendant's race. 101 Batson relied on both prophylactic
third party standing (to protect the rights of the stricken jurors) and direct
remedial reasons (to protectthe equal protection rights ofthe defendant). 102 In
Powers v. Ohio, 103 the Rehnquist Court extended Batson to a case in which the
defendant was white and the excluded jurors were African-American. 104 The
only equal protection rights at stake were those of the excluded jurors, not those
ofthe defendant. Therefore, one could not say that the Constitution demanded
that the defendant have standing to challenge the discrimination. Nonetheless,
the Court recognized third party standing based solely on the need to safeguard
the rights ofthe excludedjurors. 105 Even though excluded jurors have the right
to sue on their own behalf, the Court relied on the practicality that "the barriers
to a suit by an excluded juror are daunting." 106 The Court reached this
conclusion based on the inherent nature of this type of litigation, rather than

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
I 04.
105.
106.

/d. at 326 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, T7 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)).
/d. at 335.
/d.
/d. at 335-37.
476 u.s. 79 (1986).
380 u.s. 202 (1965).
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
/d. at 97-98.
499 u.s. 400 (1991).
/d. at 409.
/d.at415.
/d. at 414.
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concrete evidence ofbarriers. 107
In Withrow v. Williams, 108 the Rehnquist Court allowed a prisoner to raise
the prophylactic rule of Miranda via a habeas corpus claim.109 Although Stone
v. Powe/1110 had refused federal habeas corpus jurisdiction over Fourth
Amendment claims based on the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 111 the
Withrow Court held that federal habeas corpus jurisdiction should be applied
to claims under Miranda. 112 While agreeing that the Miranda rights were
prophylactic, the Withrow Court said "calling the Miranda safeguards
'prophylactic,' however, is a far cry from putting Miranda on all fours with
Mapp, or from rendering Miranda subject to Stone." 113 Unlike Mapp, the
Court said, Miranda safeguards "a fundamental trial right" by serving to guard
against the use of unreliable evidence, and the application of the Stone rule
would not significantly lighten the burdens on federal courts. 114
Similarly, in United States v. Paradise, 115 the Court upheld a lower court
injunction imposing "a one-black-for-one-white promotion requirement to be
applied as an interim measure to state trooper promotions in the Alabama
Department of Public Safety."116 The Court approved this "race-conscious
remedy because the defendants had thwarted race-neutral remedies that might
otherwise have been effective." 117
The Rehnquist Court also suggested that in some circumstances, state
and local governments may undertake affirmative action to ensure against
the risk of racial discrimination. The Court's opinion in Freeman v. Pitts 118
acknowledged:
[T]he potential for discrimination and racial hostility is still present in our
country, and its manifestations may emerge in new and subtle forms after
the effects of de jure segregation have been eliminated. It is the duty of the
State and its subdivisions to ensure that such forces do not shape or control

107. /d. at414-15.
108. 507 u.s. 680 (1993).
109. /d. at 683.
110. 428 u.s. 465 (1976).
Ill. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
112. Withrow, 507 U.S. at 686.
113. /d.at691.
114. /d. at 691-94. But see Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990)(refusingto extend
the prophylactic rule of Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), to exclude the use of the
defendant's statement to police for impeachment purposes). Under Jackson, the statement
would have been inadmissible because the defendant had first requested counsel and then
waived counsel. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636. The Harvey Court said Jackson's prophylactic
rule should not be extended to shield perjury. Harvey, 494 U.S. at 353.
115. 480U.S.149(1987).
116. /d. at 153 (plurality opinion).
117. See Brian K. Landsberg, Race and the RehnquistCourt, 66 TuL. L. REv. 1267, 1310
(1992).
118. 503 u.s. 467 (1992).

1999]

PROPHYLACTIC RULES

941

the policies of its school systems.119

As to the courts' role, Justice Blackmun' s concurrence added: "[T]o determine
[the defendant school system's] possible role in encouraging the residential
segregation, the court must examine the situation with special care." 120
While approving some forms of affirmative action, the Rehnquist Court
extended the prophylactic rule articulated in footnote four of Carolene Products
to situations involving discrimination against white persons and even to racebased governmental action that Jacked a discriminatory effect. 121 The plurality
opinion in City ofRichmond v. J A. Croson Co. 122 argued that "the purpose of
strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the
legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use ofa highly
suspect tool." 123 The plurality referred to the danger that race-based
governmental decisions would cause stigmatic harm and that it would be
difficult to determine whether such decisions were benign, remedial, or
illegitimate. 124 The Court adopted this reasoning in AdarandConstructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 125 where it applied the Croson test to federal legislation. 126 The Court
said that strict scrutiny of federal race-based legislation would "ensure that the
personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed." 127
Similarly, in Shaw v. Reno, 128 the Court adopted a rule forbidding race-based
voting districts that lacked sufficient justification, even where the districting
plan did not dilute the vote of any racial group. 129 The Court, citing no
evidence in support, reasoned that the rule was necessary because such

119. /d. at 490.
120. /d. at 513 (Biackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
121. See generally Larry Alexander, Affirmative Action and Legislative Purpose, I 07
YALE L.J. 2679 (1997); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427 (1997).
122. 488 u.s. 469 (1989).
123. /d. at 493 (plurality opinion). However, Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion
recognized that Congress's "power to 'enforce' may at times also include the power to define
situations which Congress determines threaten principles ofequality and to adopt prophylactic
rules to deal with those situations." /d. at 490 (plurality opinion).
124. Paul Brest had already anticipated this argument and rejoined:
[W]here the objective and immediate effect are to benefit minority persons, it seems
inappropriate to subject the practice to the demanding criteria ofthe suspect classification
standard. It should suffice for a policymaker to conclude that the probable benefits
outweigh the harms, that the benefits cannot readily be gained by other than racedependent means, and that the program is designed to minin:tize its possible adverse
consequences.
Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense ofthe Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. I , 19
(1976).
125. 515 u.s. 200 (1995).
126. !d. at 237-40.
127. /d. at 226.
128. 509 u .s . 630 ( 1993).
129. /d. at 658.
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reapportionment legislation "reinforces racial stereotypes and threatens to
undermine our system of representative democracy." 130 Thus, the cases that
undermine affirmative action seem to draw much of their force from
prophylactic reasoning related to risks of improper motives and the related risk
of stereotyping individuals.
D. The October 1996 and 1997 Terms

In the October 1996 and 1997 Terms, the Rehnquist Court seemed to
undertake a substantial rethinking of prophylactic rules. The Court reviewed
twelve cases involving prophylactic measures the government had designed to
ensure rights under the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment. 131 It
approved the prophylactic measures in only three of them, and in two of those
cases the approval was only partial. 132 The Court reviewed three other cases
involving what one might consider prophylactic protections against the risk of
undermining structural protections in the Constitution. 133 It approved the
prophylactic measures in one of those cases_l 34 Finally, the Court reviewed
several cases involving risk-avoidance measures, approving them in three
cases 135 and disapproving them in two. 136
Several possible explanations might exist for the pattern of rejection of
prophylactic measures in the 1996 and 1997 Terms. The decisions may reflect
the beginning of the decline of prophylactic rules, injunctions, and statutes.
Conversely, the decisions may simply be an aberration from the normal pattern
ofapproving many prophylactic measures while disapproving few. The cases
may reflect the operation of a dialectic: the Court first approves prophylactic
measures; advocates, lower courts, and Congress stretch the boundaries of

130. Jd at 650. The Court did require proof of justification: "[R]acial bloc voting and
minority-group cohesion never can be assumed, but specifically must be proved in each case
in order to establish that a redistricting plan dilutes minority voting strength in violation of
§ 2." /d. at 653.
131. Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269 (1998); Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392
(1998); NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998); Pennsylvania Bd. ofProbation & Parole v. Scott,
524 U.S. 357 (1998); United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998); Abrams v. Johnson, 521
U.S. 74 (1997); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 {1997); Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 ( 1997); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519
U.S. 357 (1997); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Ohio v. Robinette,
519 u.s. 33 (1996).
132. Campbell, 523 U.S. at 392; Schenck, 519 U.S. at 357 (partial approval); Abrams,
52 I U.S. at 74 (partial approval).
133. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town ofHarrison, 520 U.S. 564 ( 1997); Clinton
v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
134. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 564.
135. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997);
Washington v. Glucksberg, 52 I U.S. 702 (I 997).
136. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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those measures; and the Court then draws sharper lines to contain the concept.
The decisions may tell us little about prophylactic measures and instead may
demonstrate the reaction of an activist Court to measures that threaten the
majority's visions of federalism and congressional power. In this article I will
focus primarily on three of these cases.
l. Description ofRecent Cases
In Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 137 the Court disapproved a prophylactic
injunction that imposed a floating buffer zone between abortion protesters and
people entering and leaving an abortion clinic. 138 The protesters' past abusive
conduct created a risk of future intimidation of patients and employees of the
clinic. 139 Nevertheless, the Court pointed out that it would be difficult for the
protesters to know how to remain in compliance. 140 It concluded: "This lack
of certainty leads to a substantial risk that much more speech will be burdened
than the injunction by its terms prohibits." 141 Thus, one prophylactic
reason-the risk of interference with the abortion right-led to entry of the
injunction. Another prophylactic concern-the risk of abridging protected
speech- Jed the Supreme Court to disapprove the original protective order.
However, the Court upheld fixed buffer zones around the doorways, driveways,
and driveway entrances where the protesters' past conduct suggested a future
risk that these areas would be blocked.142 The Court added: "[B]ecause
defendants' harassment of police hampered the ability ofthe police to respond
quickly to a problem, a prophylactic measure was even more appropriate." 143
The Court supported this ruling by citing a case that upheld a legislatively
imposed buffer zone around polling places, in which campaigning was not
allowed. 144 The standard the Schenck Court applied had been fashioned in
Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc. 145 and was also predicated on
prophylactic considerations. The Madsen Court said that "somewhat more
stringent application ofgeneral First Amendment principles" should be applied
to injunctions than to ordinances because"[o]rdinances represent a legislative
choice regarding the promotion ofparticular societal interests. Injunctions, by
contrast, are remedies imposed for violations (or threatened violations) of a
legislative or judicial decree. Injunctions also carry greater risks of censorship

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Schenck,51 9U.S.at377.
/d.
/d. at 362-63.
/d. at 378.
/d. at 377.
/d. at 380-8 1.
!d. at 382.
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 ,206-07 (1992).
512 u.s. 753 (1994).
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and discriminatory application than do general ordinances." 146 In his dissent,
Justice Scalia argued that these and other reasons required application of strict
scrutiny. 147 Justice Scalia noted the risk of placing the right of free speech
within the control of judges who have "often ... been chagrined by prior
disobedience of their orders." 148
Schenck can be read as expanding rather than contracting prophylactic
doctrine. 149 What has changed is the locus or type of risk. In Schenck and
Madsen, the risk that the lower court will overreach leads to prophylactic
heightened scrutiny. Note that a similar distrust of the lower courts was at
work in Mazurek v. Armstrong, 150 where the Court worried about the prospect
that lower courts might enter multiple erroneous injunctions against
enforcement of state abortion laws. 151
Schenck reflects a distrust ofparticular prophylactic measures-possibly
146. /d. at 764. The Court expressed similar prophylactic concerns as to legislation in
Board ofEducation v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994):
The anomalously case-specific nature of the legislature's exercise of state authority in
creating this district for a religious community leaves the Court without any direct way
to review such state action for the purpose of safeguarding [the] principle ... that
government should not prefer one religion to another, or religion to irreligion.
147. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 790 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148. /d. at 793 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In another case, Justice Scalia reiterated
prophylactic concerns based on mistrust of lower courts and called for close scrutiny of a
decision "when the grounds are newly minted after a remand, contradict what was said before
the remand, and bear indication of an attempt to evade the consequences of our holding
prompting the remand." Williams v. Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc., 520 U.S. I I 33,
1133 ( 1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
In contrast to his concern about the individuated nature of the injunction in Madsen, in
Grumet Scalia argued:
Making Jaw (and making exceptions) one case at a time, whether through adjudication
or through highly particularized rulemaking or legislation, violates, ex ante, no principle
of fairness, equal protection, or neutrality, simply because it does not announce in
advance how all future cases (and all future exceptions) will be disposed of.
Grumet, 512 U.S. at 748 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In yet another case, Justice Scalia saw greater
risk of unfairness in a local ordinance than in federal legislation. City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,522 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that
objectivity and flexibility, "political qualities already to be doubted in a national legislature[,]
... are substantially less likely to exist at the state or local level").
149. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997). Schenck applied
heightened scrutiny to a district court injunction imposing a floating buffer zone between antiabortion protesters and persons entering and leaving an abortion clinic. I d.
150. 520 u.s. 968 (1997).
151. In Mazurek, the Court overturned a preliminary injunction against a state statute
forbidding physician assistants to perform abortions. /d. at 974. The Court was concerned
with the threat to other state statutes and the absence of proof of improper legislative purpose.
/d. at 972-73. See also Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997) (evaluating a perceived risk
that the Department of Justice might have applied an inappropriate race-based standard in
evaluating the reapportionment plans).
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overbroad injunctions and race-based reapportionment plans-but not a general
rejection of the prophylactic concept. Instead, Schenck employs prophylactic
reasoning to reject portions of the injunction. One can see the case as
suggesting that the disapproved portions of the Schenck injunction were not
prophylactic in the sense of protecting individual rights. The district court had
initially based the injunction at issue in Schenck in part on prophylactic
protection of federal rights. However, after the Supreme Court's decision in
Bray v. Alexandria Women 's Health Clinic, 152 the district court reaffirmed its
injunction based solely on state law grounds. 153 As a formal matter, the
injunction no longer protected Fourteenth Amendment rights. Schenck,
therefore, may simply stand for the proposition that courts will judge measures
designed to avoid risk in light ofthe nature ofthat risk. The Court did not view
the risks as relating to constitutional rights; they simply represented policy
judgments. So read, Schenck is not a case of one prophylactic rule
overpowering another, but of a prophylactic rule overpowering a nonprophylactic risk-avoidance measure. The decision has little to do with
concerns about federalism or congressional power. Although Schenck reviewed
a federal court injunction, the Court applied the same standard as it had
previously applied to the state court injunction in Madsen. 154
In Agostini v. Felton, 155 the Court markedly changed its prior emphasis on
risk as an element in Establishment Clause doctrine. Previous cases had held
that placement of public school teachers in parochial schools posed "a
substantial risk" that they "may well subtly (or overtly) conform their
instruction to the environment in which they teach, while students will perceive
the instruction provided in the context of the dominantly religious message of
the institution, thus reinforcing the indoctrinating effect. " 156 The Court did not
rely on evidence to reach this conclusion, instead treating this risk as selfevident. This risk led to the need to monitor the behavior of the public school
teachers, which the Court held led in tum to excessive entanglement of the
school system with religion. 157
In Agostini, the Court ruled that intervening cases had "abandoned the
presumption ... that the placement of public employees on parochial school
grounds inevitably results in the impermissible effect of state-sponsored
indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic union between government and

152. 506 U.S. 263 ( 1993) (holding that women seeking an abortion are not a protected
class under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)).
153. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 369.
154. Federalism concerns also would have led to a different result in Abrams-deferring
to the state legislature's reapportionment plan rather than assuming that it might be tarnished
by improper racial motivations.
155. 521 u.s. 203 (1997).
156. School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 388 (1985).
157. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402,409 (1985).
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religion." 158 The Court found "no reason to presume that, simply because she
enters a parochial school classroom, a full-time public employee such as a Title
I teacher will depart from her assigned duties and embark on religious
indoctrination" and further found no evidence ofsuch behavior.159 Essentially,
an unexplained shift to the plaintiffs of the burden of demonstrating risk
replaced the early case law's equally unexplained placement on the school
authorities of the burden of negating risk.
In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 160 the Court rejected a First
Amendment challenge to the must-carry provisions of the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992. 161 Congress, fearing that
the failure of cable television systems to carry less popular broadcast stations
would lead to a reduction in the number of broadcast stations available to
individuals who did not subscribe to cable, imposed requirements to carry
broadcast stations on the cable systems. 162 Cable system operators filed suit to
challenge the constitutionality of the must-carry provisions under the First
Amendment. 163 In reviewing the First Amendment challenge, the Court said:
Even in the realm of First Amendment questions where Congress must base
its conclusions upon substantial evidence, deference must be accorded to its
findings as to the harm to be avoided and to the remedial measures adopted
for that end, lest we infringe on traditional legislative authority to make
predictive judgments when enacting nationwide regulatory policy. 164

Risk played three roles in the test the Court applied. The Court began by
declaring that content-neutral statutes that regulate expression pose less risk to
free speech than content-based statutes. Therefore, the Court applies "less
rigorous analysis" to content-neutral statutes. 165 The Court seemed to soften
the scrutiny further because Congress had found a counter-risk and searching
scrutiny poses the risk of the Court assuming a legislative role. The Court
found that extensive evidence presented to Congress provided "a substantial
basis to support Congress' conclusion that a real threat justified enactment of
the must-carry provisions." 166 The dissenting opinion of four Justices argued
that the majority exhibited "an extraordinary and unwarranted deference for
congressionaljudgments." 167 However, the Court parsed in unusual detail the
evidence ofthe cable companies' power, their past exclusion ofsome broadcast

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223.
/d. at 226.
520 u.s. 180 (1997).
!d. at 224.
/d.at190.
/d. at 185-86.
/d.at196.
/d.at213.
/d. at 196.
/d. at 258 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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channels, the tenuous financial condition of many broadcast channels, the
impact of must-carry rules on cable carriers, and the shortcomings of
alternative proposals to protect broadcasters. 168 In short, the Court viewed this
not as a case of unsupported congressional predictions of risk, but a case in
which past events provided persuasive credibility to those predictions.
2. Contradictions in Recent Cases
The Court has recently displayed a schizophrenic attitude toward
prophylactic measures. It has manifested distrust ofjudges, worrying that they
might go too far in fashioning prophylactic rules and injunctions, but it has also
upheld prophylactic injunctions as proper exercises ofjudicial discretion and
has itself created numerous prophylactic rules. It has emphasized the need for
deference to prophylactic rulemaking by Congress and the states, but has
withheld that deference where the rule offended the Court's own prophylactic
understanding. The Court has used the term "prophylactic" as an epithet 169 and
as a term of virtue. 170 Some prophylactic measures have been rejected as
insufficiently grounded in facts, 171 while others have been adopted based on the
Court's factual assumptions. 172 It may be true that "the policy-oriented,
instrumental character oflaw [has become] our dominant conception." 173 But
that "dominant conception" does not rule out the desirability or possibility of
the Court developing-as it has not yet done-a consistent, coherent approach
to prophylactic measures.
III. DEVELOPING A COHERENT APPROACH TO PROPHYLACTIC RULES

A coherent approach to prophylactic rules first requires precision of
terminology. 174 It makes no sense to use the same term to describe measures

168. !d. at 196-212.
169. E.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 777 (1993) ("'Broad prophylactic rules in the
area of free expression are suspect"')(quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
170. E.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 381 (1997).
171. E.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997) ("[RFRA's] legislative
record lacks examples of modem instances of generally applicable laws passed because of
religious bigotry."); see also Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269 (1998); Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203 (1997); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997); Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S.
968 (1997).
172. E.g., Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998) (assuming that the introduction of a
codefendant's confession with the defendant's name redacted and replaced by "blank" is so
prejudicial that limiting instructions cannot work); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200 (1995) (adopting strict scrutiny of congressionally adopted racial preferences).
173. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 83, at 22.
174. "Words are our tools, and, as a minimum we should use clean tools: we should know
what we mean and what we do not, and we must forearm ourselves against the traps that
language sets us." J.L. Austin, A Plea For Excuses, in FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 9
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designed to protect against risks to constitutionally protected rights and risks
to the core rights themselves or risks to ordinary police power measures. 175
This indiscriminate use of the term leads to striking down some provisions
because they are merely "prophylactics" (addressing risk to some police power
concern) while upholding others because they are prophylactic (protecting
against risks to constitutionally protected rights). In a similar vein, one should
be able to differentiate between measures that forbid deprivation ofa core right
and measures directed at the risk of such deprivation. Core rights should be
less susceptible to congressional tinkering 176 or judicial reconsideration.
A clearer understanding of whether and when it is appropriate to impose
prophylactic measures is more important than terminology. The question is not
so much whether prophylactic measures are a good idea, but how they fit into
the constitutional structure offederalism and separation ofpowers. 177 Does the
Constitution permit the federal courts to impose prophylactic rules or
injunctions on the states or federal entities? To what extent does it permit
Congress to impose prophylactic rules? Is there a clear delineation between
prophylactic and core constitutional rules?
Prophylactic rules in constitutional law arise in a variety of ways.
Reference to the ends-means analysis of McCulloch v. Maryland' 78 justifies
prophylactic rules Congress has adopted. Prophylactic injunctions are based

(Herbert Morris ed., 1961 ).
175. Not all agree that such precision is helpful or possible. Michael C. Dorf and Charles
F. Sabel argue: "The fact that the Court's Fifth Amendment jurisprudence is labeled
prophylactic while its jurisprudence ofthe First Amendment is not, at best imperfectly reflects
the Court's view about the relative importance of these rights, but it reflects no deep reality."
Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel. A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REv. 267,456 (1998). They refer to a similar point made by Strauss, Ubiquity,
supra note 45, at 204-07. On the other hand, Dorf and Sabel give their own definition in the
next paragraph: "Wherever judicially established rules comprise an effort to give effect to
more deeply established but vaguer legal norms, the judicial doctrine may be regarded as
prophylactic." Dorf & Sabel, supra, at 457. Henry P. Monaghan argues that "the distinction
between true constitutional rules and constitutional common law (including prophylactic rules]
lies in the clarity with which the former is perceived to be related to the core policies
underlying the constitutional provision." Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1, 33 (1975). However, Thomas S. Schrock and Robert C.
Welsh argue that "Monaghan fails to provide workable criteria" for distinguishing the two.
Thomas S. Schrock and Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1117, 1146 (1978)
176. Compare, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act unconstitutional because Congress lacked the power to overrule a
Supreme Court decision as to the meaning ofthe free exercise clause ofthe First Amendment),
with United States v. Rivas-Lopez, 1997 WL 809554 (D. Utah 1997) (upholding 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501 , which purported to supersede Miranda in federal prosecutions).
177. See Grano, Prophylactic Rules, supra note 6, at 124.
178. 17U.S.(4Wheat.)315(1819).
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on equitable doctrine. 179 Judicially fashioned prophylactic rules have a murkier
origin. By definition, they are not rules found in the Constitution. They are
instrumental rules designed to assure compliance with the Constitution. Since
the three kinds ofprophylactic rules-injunctive rules, judicial rules ofgeneral
application, and statutory rules-are separately grounded, one must take care
in transferring principles regarding one variety to cases involving a different
variety of prophylactic rule.

A. Justifications for Judicially Created Prophylactic Rules
Judicially created prophylactic rules of general applicability are the most
problematic. 180 They most resemble legislation; they may intrude on state
prerogatives; and yet, they lack clear textual warrant in the Constitution. 181

179. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
180. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 175, at 452-64 (arguing that prophylactic rules are
justified, not as constitutional common law, but as prototypes of constititutional
jurisprudence). Compare Martha A. Field, Sources ofLaw: The Scope ofFederal Common
Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 892 n.42 (1986) (prophylactic rules, whether compelled by the
Constitution or inspired by it, constitute federal common law), and Monaghan, supra note 175
(prophylactic rules justified as constitutional common Jaw), with Grano, Prophylactic Rules,
supra note 6, at 129-36 (prophylactic rules not justifiable as constitutional common law), and
Schrock & Welsh, supra note 175 (constitutional common Jaw is illegitimate and may be
pernicious).
181 . This argument has been taken up by Joseph D. Grano, who maintains that the
Constitution does not grant the Supreme Court the kind of prophylactic power exercised in
Miranda. Joseph D. Grano, Miranda's Constitutional Difficulties: A Reply to Professor
Schulhofer, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 174 (1988) [hereinafter Grano, Reply]. Professor Grano argues
that a "prophylactic rule in the constitutional context is a court-created rule that can be
violated without violating the Constitution itself." Id. at 176-77 (citing Michigan v. Payne,
412 U.S. 47, 53 (1973)). Grano argues that Article Ill of the Constitution does not authorize
the Supreme Court to reverse a state court conviction when the Constitution has not been
violated. Id at 178. Since the Fifth Amendment forbids only compelled self-incrimination,
it follows, according to Grano, that Miranda, which would require reversal in some cases
where the defendant has voluntarily incriminated herself, exercises powers beyond those
granted by Article Ill. Id. at 177-78.
David A. Strauss, in response, observes that prophylactic rules are ubiquitous in
constitutional litigation and are used to "attempt to minimize the sum of error costs and
administrative costs." Strauss, Ubiquity, supra note 45, at 193. His prime example comes
from First Amendment law. Professor Strauss argues that the rule of Lovell v. Griffin, 303
U.S. 444 (1938)(allowing a person to challenge the validity of a city ordinance even though
he had not sought and been denied the requisite permission to distribute literature), was a
prophylactic rule typical of those in subsequent First Amendment cases. Strauss, Ubiquity,
supra note 45, at 196. Professor Grano denies, however, that the rule of Lovell was
prophylactic. In his view, it is a case of an actual violation ofthe First Amendment. Grano,
Reply, supra at 189. Presumably, Grano would take the same position regarding Strauss's
argument that the Court's more stringent review of content discrimination also is a
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Nonetheless, the nature of our constitution, the nature of courts, and analogy
to other prophylactic measures that are more clearly legitimate all tend to
support the judicial imposition of prophylactic general rules. 182 Ultimately,
prophylactic rules of general application fall into Justice Jackson 's "zone of
twilight in which [the Court] and Congress may have concurrent authority, or
in which its distribution is uncertain." 183
The Supreme Court has emerged as the final arbiter of constitutional law,
but Congress and the states are considered the final arbiters of statutory law,
so long as it complies with the Constitution. The difficulty with judicially
created prophylactic rules is that they are neither strictly applications of the
Constitution nor are they strictly legislative actions. They are best
characterized as hybrid rules. They are based on the Constitution because they
are predicated on a judicial judgment that the risk of a constitutional violation
is sufficiently great that simple case-by-case enforcement of the core right is
insufficient to secure that right. In reaching that judgment, the Court does what
courts traditionally have done in the Anglo-American system of common law
and equity. However, there may be myriad ways to reach the objective of
safeguarding constitutional rights. The Court acts in a legislative fashion when
it chooses a particular method. The Constitution may demand imposition of a
prophylactic rule, but it does not demand a particular one. In this respect,
prophylactic rules resemble rules of evidence, remedy, procedure, and common
law. One may characterize all ofthese rules as judicial legislation, all ofwhich
are subject to revision by the legislative branch.
Prophylactic rules also bear a family resemblance to bright-line core
prophylactic rule designed more to protect the First Amendment rather than to enforce it.
Strauss also points to the opinion of three justices in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)
(holding that U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 5 empowers Congress to hold a state statute violative
of equal protection, regardless ofrationa1 basis review) as deferring to Congress's exercise of
prophylactic review of state statutes. Strauss, Ubiquity, supra note 45, at 206. Strauss argues
that this is an appropriate use of prophylactic rules, because "in deciding constitutional cases,
the courts constantly consider institutional capacities and propensities . . . courts create
constitutional doctrine by taking into account both the principles and values reflected in the
relevant constitutional provisions and institutional realities." /d. at 207. However, Strauss
provides no limiting principle for the use of prophylactic measures other than the broad
balancing test he employs in his formulation. ·
182. I do not address the "supervisory power" of the federal courts in federal criminal
prosecutions because this power poses somewhat different issues. See Sara Sun Beale,
Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on
the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1433, 1435 (1984) (surveying the
sources of the "supervisory power" to conclude that "the concept of supervisory power should
be abandoned in favor of identifying more specifically the constitutional or statutory power
being employed").
183. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). Jackson added: "In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of
law." Id. (footnote omitted).
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constitutional rules. Lillian R. Bevier has pointed out that public forum
analysis under the free speech guarantees ofthe First Amendment "is rule-based
and categorical." 184 Forum analysis shows more faith in judgments by local
governments than by courts. Forum analysis is a judicial construct not found
in the Constitution, but because the Court has treated it as somehow being part
of the core meaning of the First Amendment, it is not a prophylactic rule. Yet,
like a prophylactic measure, a bright-line rule "captures the background
principle or policy incompletely and so produces errors of over- or underinclusiveness."185 If core constitutional rules are legitimate despite being overor under-inclusive, we should not hold prophylactic rules illegitimate simply
because they may be over-inclusive.
Although the text ofthe Constitution does not directly support prophylactic
rules, the Preamble does state that one of its objectives is to "secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." 186 In a sense, the
Constitution itself is a set of prophylactic rules. The objective is government
without tyranny. The original mechanisms for achieving the objective were not
bans on tyranny, but the structural protections of federalism, checks and
balances, and separation of powers. Chief Justice Marshall used prophylactic
reasoning in Marbury, broadly suggesting that judicial review was needed to
guard against the risk that Congress might enact laws that conflict with the
Constitution. 187 So, too, the First Amendment is in part a prophylactic rule
guaranteeing the public the right to expose governmental error. One could take
the prophylactic aspect ofthe Constitution as providing support by analogy for
the creation of prophylaCtic rules. One might also argue that the structural
protections were meant to be exclusive, thus negating the creation of
prophylactic rules. However, nothing in the constitutional text or debates
suggests that this is the case. 188
The framers were aware ofthe tendency ofgovernment toward tyranny and
the consequent need to guard against erosion of fundamental liberties. Riskavoidance rules provide a logical and traditional means of protecting against
such erosion. Indeed, the notion of risk-avoidance rules designed to ensure
compliance with core rules in a written text predates our Constitution. It can
be traced at least to biblical times. A body ofancient Jewish law regarding risk
begins with Leviticus and God's command to Moses: "You shall safeguard my

184. Lillian R. Bevier, Rehabilitating Public Forum Doctrine: In Defense ofCategories,
1992 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 114.
185. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices ofRules and Standards, I 06 HARV.
L. REv. 22, 58 (1992). Sullivan does not refer to bright-line rules, but her definition of"rule"
is a legal directive that "binds a decisionmaker to respond in a determinate way to the
presence of delimited triggering facts." /d. (footnote omitted).
186. U.S. CONST. preamble.
187. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
188. For example, Madison referred to "the extent and proper structure of the Union" as
"a republican remedy," not the sole remedy. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 84 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961 ).
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charge." 189 The "charge" to which Leviticus refers is not about rights in the
modern sense, but about obligations. To the devout, safeguarding God's charge
is ofoverriding importance, and that charge encompasses analogues to modern
rights, such as welfare and equal treatment. 190
The Talmud expands on the Levitical principle: "[M]ake a hedge for the
Torah." 191 One authority defines the fence as "[p]reventive rabbinic injunctions
enacted to safeguard the observance of biblical commandments" 192 and
explains: "The 'fence' consisted of a stringent intensification of the law to
safeguard the original commandments." 193 For example, in Exodus, Jews are
enjoined that during Passover nothing fermented and no leaven shall be seen
throughout their territory. 194 This commandment requires one to draw a line
between those items that are fermented or leavened and those that are not. The
steps that rabbinic tradition imposes to ensure that this commandment is kept
go well beyond the literal text. For example, the ban on the use during Passover
of plates and utensils that are used during the rest ofthe year does not appear
in the biblical text, but has been added to guard against any possibility of
violating the commandment. Similarly, although the commandment to eat the
meat of a sacrifice could theoretically be fulfilled up until dawn, the Sages said
that this commandment could be performed only until midnight, "in order to
distance a person from sin." 195
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. , 196
adopted the Talmudic metaphor. 197 Commenting on the structural safeguards
of the Constitution's separation of powers, Scalia said: "[I]t is a prophylactic
189. Leviticus 18:30 (Tanach, Mesorah Publ. 1996).
190. See, e.g., id 19:9-10 (leaving crops for gleaners); id 19:15 (equal justice for rich and
poor).
191. Pirke Aboth 1:1, in THE ETHICS OF THE TALMUD: SAYINGS OF THE FATHERS 19 (R.
Travers Herford ed. '&trans., Schocken Books 1962). Others translate the text as "[m]ake a
fence for the Torah." See, e.g., ARYEH KAPLAN, HANDBOOK OF JEWISH THOUGHT 223 ( 1979);
THEENCYCLOPEDIAOFTHE]EWISHRELIGION 143 (Zvi Werblowsky & Geoffrey Wigodaeds.,
1965) ("fence [around the law)"). The Hebrew word being translated as "hedge" or "fence"
is seyag.
192. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE JEWISH RELIGION, supra note 191, at 143.
193. /d at 144.
194. See Exodus 13:8 (Torah).
195. 2 TALMUD BAVLI, Mei 'eimasai 2a (Mesorah Pub!., 2d ed 1997) (footnote omitted);
see also THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE JEWISH RELIGION, supra note 191 , at 144 (referring to "the
prohibition against eating the paschal sacrifices after midnight, although according to biblical
law they may be eaten until morning"). Levine, supra note I, also mentions this example:
In the case of the paschal lamb, the Torah not only mandates eating meat, but adds a
prohibition against leaving over the meat until morning. Thus, to guard against violation
of this prohibition, the Sages advised that the meat be eaten before midnight, far in
advance of the morning hour.
/d. at 450 n.50 (citing Exodus 12:10 (Torah)).
196. 514 u.s. 211 (1995).
197. /d at 239.
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device, establishing high walls and clear distinctions because low walls and
vague distinctions will not be judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch
conflict." 198 Scalia continued, citing "a distinctively American poet: Good
fences make good neighbors." 199
The Talmudic rules depend on slippery slope reasoning, the inclination of
human beings to cut corners, and the conflict in each person's mind between
good and evil. Rabbi Akiba explained: "Laughter and levity accustom a man to
immorality. Tradition is a fence for Torah. Tithes are a fence for riches.
Vows are a fence for saintliness. A fence for wisdom is silence." 200 However,
not every conceivable danger warranted a risk-avoidance rule: "The Sanhedrin
only had an obligation to enact legislation to enact safeguards to prevent likely
violations. Safeguards were not enacted to protect against the unlikely."201
Talmudic approval of risk avoidance rules might seem to violate another
biblical admonition: "See that you observe everything that I command you: you
must not add anything to it, nor take anything away from it."202 Moses
Maimonides treats the admonition as based on avoidance of risk, saying that
adding to or detracting from the Torah "might have led to the corruption ofthe
rules of the Law and to the belief that the latter did not come from God." 203
Thus, it appears that the risk of corrupting the law is invoked to forbid adding
further risk avoidance rules. However, one must distinguish the core
commandment from measures aimed at eliminating the risk of violating
it. Maimonides reconciled the notion of a hedge and the ban on adding to the
law by noting that the hedge neither adds to nor detracts from the
core commandment. Rather, the hedge is simply a means to ensure
the commandment's observance. 204 The hedge does not change the
commandment, but tends to enforce it. Maimonides explained that this
admonition "permit[ s) the men of knowledge of every period, I refer to the
Great Court of Law, to take precautions with a view to consolidating the
ordinances of the Law by means of regulations in which they innovate with a
view to repairing fissures, and to perpetuate these precautionary measures. " 205
A later chapter of Deuteronomy employs parallel language to underscore
the courts' authority and to command compliance with judicial decisions: "Act

198. !d.
199. /d. Justice Breyer, concurring, riposted that Robert Frost also wrote, "Something
there is that doesn't love a wall," as well as, "Before I built a wall I'd ask to know/What I was
walling in or walling out." Jd at 1466 (Breyer, J., concurring)(quoting Robert Frost, Mending
Wall, in THE NEW OXFORD BOOK OF AMERICAN VERSE 395-96 (Richard Ell manned., 1976)).
200. Pirke A both, supra note 191, 111.17, at 85.
20 I. KAPLAN, supra note 191, at 224.
202. Deuteronomy 12:32 (New English Bible 1970); see also Deuteronomy 13: I (Torah,
Henry Holt & Co. 1996).
203. MOSES MAJMONIDES, THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED§ III.41, at 563 (Shlomo Pines
trans., Univ. Chicago Press 1963).
204. See id.
205. /d.
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on the instruction which they give you, or on the precedent that they cite; do not
swerve from what they tell you, either to right or to left."206 If prophylactic
rules inherently flow from the creation of written core rules, it follows that the
courts are a natural source for framing prophylactic rules.
The Talmudic interpretations of the Bible help explain why it may be
legitimate for the Court to adopt rules safeguarding the Cof\stitution. Scholars
who believed in the sanctity and immutability of the Biblical text nonetheless
saw the need to expand upon that text. They were advantaged by the existence
ofthe two commandments with which I began this article, alternately requiring
Talmudic scholars to safeguard God's charge and forbidding them to add to or
subtract from it.207 The Talmudic scholars were forced to reconcile these two
seemingly contradictory messages. The language ofthe Constitution, ofcourse,
contains neither of these Biblical commandments. Its text neither forbids
judicial addition or subtraction nor requires judicial safeguarding.
Interpretations over the years have led to general acceptance of the notion that
the Court lacks authority to add to or subtract from the core constitutional
rules. Yet, one may still recognize this unwritten rule and not foreclose the
Court from recognizing that it also has an obligation to safeguard core
constitutional rights. The two implicit constitutional rules may coexist just as
the two explicit biblical rules have successfully coexisted. This possibility
becomes readily apparent when one examines Marbury v. Madison. 208
The Marbury Court reasoned that the power ofjudicial review inhered in
the nature of the Article III ·~udicial Power."209 Courts decide cases by
applying the law. If two laws conflict, they must choose which law to apply.
Because the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, the Court must
determine whether a conflict exists between the Constitution and the challenged
law. Ifthe Court finds a conflict, it must apply the Constitution. 2 10 This theory
of Marbury, however, does not extend directly to judicially created rules that
build a "fence" around the Constitution. 211 Any support Marbury might lend
to prophylactic rules is indirect, stemming from the Court's reliance on the

206. Deuteronomy 17: II (New English Bible 1970).
207. Leviticus 18:30 (Tanach, Mesorah Pub!. 1996); Deuteronomy 12:32 (New English
Bible 1970).
208. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
209. "The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S.
CONST. art. Ill,§ I; see also id art. III,§ 2, cl.l ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases,
in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution.").
21 0. Alexander Hamilton made much the same argument some 15 years earlier. See THE
FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
211. Indeed, Professor Grano contends that prophylactic rules are inconsistent with
Marbury: "Under Marbury, the Court does not assume the role of special guardian of
constitutional liberties. Rather, the Court invalidates legislation or official conduct only
because it must decide cases brought under the Constitution, which has priority over other
law." Grano, Prophylactic Rules, supra note 6, at 136.
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nature of the judicial power. One argument asserts that because Article III
confers the judicial power on the federal courts to decide cases, to do so they
must fashion rules to govern the result of each case. Those rules should
safeguard the Constitution,212 and through the system ofprecedent, these rules
will apply to similar future cases. As a result, prophylactic rules become part
of both the constitution-enforcing and common-law processes. 213
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents,214 the Court looked to
the common Jaw functions of federal courts in allowing a private suit in federal
court for damages arising from a deprivation ofFourth Amendment rights. 215
Justice Harlan, concurring, argued that "the range ofpolicy considerations [the
Court] may take into account are at least as broad as those a legislature would
consider with respect to an express statutory authorization of a traditional
remedy."216 Later, in Davis v. Passman,211 the Court noted that "the judiciary
is clearly discernible as the primary means through which these [constitutional]
rights may be enforced."218 It was through the common law of torts that
principles of risk-avoidance, such as negligence and strict liability, evolved.
According to one view, the tort system serves economic core values by "a kind

212. Hamilton stressed "that there ought always to be a constitutional method of giving
efficacy to constitutional provisions." THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 475 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961 ); see also James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual
Power": The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article lii Courts, 98
COLUM. L. REv. 696, 768-69 (1998) (arguing that the history of Article Ill reflects that its
focus was "the quality of'[t]hejudicial Power' to decide any given appeal so as effectively to
superintend the state judicial check on state law").
213. Beale, supra note 182, at 1468-77 (explaining what Beale calls the "ancillary
authority" of federal courts under Article III to establish procedural rules). Though Beale
carefully limits her argument to apply only to narrowly defined procedural rules, she concludes
that implicit in the grant ofjudicial power is a "grant of incidental authority comparable to the
necessary and proper clause." !d. at 1471. Beale's conclusion may appear to support
judicially created prophylactic rules, so long as Congress is given "the final say." !d. at 1472.
Indeed, she classifies remedial measures, procedural rules, and some prophylactic rules as
"constitutional common law." !d. at 1514. However, she concludes by suggesting that
Miranda is constitutionally unsupportable in federal prosecutions: "In the absence of any
constitutional violation, the exclusion of evidence or the dismissal of a prosecution infringes
on the authority of Congress to enact substantive criminal laws and the authority of the
executive branch to enforce those laws by investigation and prosecution." !d. at 1515-16.
Presumably, Beale would reach the same conclusion as to state court prosecutions on
federalism grounds.
214. 403 u.s. 388 (1971).
215. !d. at 395-97.
216. !d. at 407 (Harlan, J ., concurring).
217. 442 u.s. 228 (1979).
218. !d. at 241; see also David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation,
63 U. CHI. L. REv. 877, 919-21 (1996) (giving examples of other instances of common-law
constitutional interpretation). Strauss concludes: "American constitutionalism, over the years,
has ... taken on the character of a common law system." !d. at 934.
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ofbalancing of potential hanns."219 "Perhaps, then, the dominant function of
the fault system is to generate rules ofliability that iffollowed will bring about,
at least approximately, the efficient-the cost-justified-level ofaccidents and
safety.'mo A common-law perspective of prophylactic measures supports
incremental, empirically-based rules that build on previously recognized legal
principles. 221
Article III confers on federal courts jurisdiction over specified types of
cases in law and equity. 222 On the role of federal equity jurisdiction, Alexander
Hamilton wrote that "the great and primary use of a court of equity is to give
relief in extraordinary cases, which are exceptions to general rules.''223
Hamilton admitted in a footnote: "[T]he principles by which that relief is
governed are now reduced to a regular system. " 224 As I will show, the framing
of prophylactic decrees is strongly rooted in equitable doctrine. Some
prophylactic rules simply make the constraints ofprophylactic decrees generally
applicable. This is the kind of reasoning that justified the Fifth Circuit's
fashioning of unifonn school desegregation decrees in the mid-1960s. 225 This
rationale is less convincing in a case like Miranda because courts of equity
would not nonnally intervene against individual police abuses. 226
Article III also confers jurisdiction on federal courts to hear cases arising
under the Constitution. 227 Is it in the nature of constitutional adjudication that
"the Supreme Court must sometimes frame doctrinal tests that cannot be linked
directly, by ordinary interpretive means, to the meaning ofthe nonns that those

219. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)
(presenting Judge Learned Hand's algebraic formulation of liability).
220. Richard A. Posner, A Theory ofNegligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 ( 1972).
221. Risk avoidance rules are, to use Professor Strauss's phrase, "ubiquitous throughout
the law." Strauss, Ubiquity, supra note 45. For example, "legal rules such as the parole
evidence requirement, the requirement that wills be signed, or presumptions of fraud in
debtor-creditor law . . . seem aimed at intentional misbehavior but must often be
overinclusive." THEODORE EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION 839 (4th ed. 1996). An
unsigned will, for example, may or may not express the putative testator's intent, but the risk
that it does not leads the court to reject all unsigned wills.
222. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
223. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 505 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961 ).
224. !d.
225. See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.
1966), modified, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
Similarly, the Swann Court's statement ofa prophylactic rule came in the context ofa decision
holding that the district court's decree was "within that court's power to provide equitable
relief." Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 30 (1971).
226. Cf Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966) (issuing an injunction against
a dragnet search of homes in black neighborhoods). But cf City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95 (1983) (holding that plaintiffs had no standing to seek equitable relief against future
police use of chokehold).
227. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2.
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tests implement"?228 If so, it becomes easy to accept the legitimacy of
prophylactic tests. Risk-avoidance rules protecting federalism 229 and separation
of powers230 are commonplace. These doctrines influenced the ruling in
Schenck, where both the majority and Justice Scalia seemed to opine that
federal court injunctions posed a greater risk to free speech than would be posed
by state legislation. 231 Similarly, in Turner Broadcasting System, the Court
sought to avoid the risk of infringing ''on traditional legislative authority to
make predictive judgments when enacting nationwide regulatory policy."232
Prophylactic rules are a subset of risk-avoidance rules. If the Court may
legitimately fashion risk-avoidance rules to protect the structural provisions of
the Constitution, it would follow that the Court may also fashion prophylactic
rules to ensure individual rights. Both are designed to vindicate constitutional
commands. Both involve judgments as to the "institutional propensities and
limitations" of government actors. 233 Moreover, "whenjudicial enforcement
seems practically necessary, and a bright-line prophylactic rule will work most
effectively at relatively low cost, not every doctrine that 'over-enforces'
constitutional norms reflects a constitutional betrayal. " 234
A related argument posits that the courts must find and enforce public
values. 235 Prophylactic rules are a natural product of value enforcement.
Indeed, the framers of the Constitution considered the courts an essential
element ofthe document's prophylactic structure. Thus, Hamilton argued that

228. Fallon, supra note 63, at 66.
229. The Court has adopted rules of statutory construction designed "to ensure that,
absent unambiguous evidence ofCongress's intent, extraordinary constitutional powers are not
invoked, or important constitutional protections eliminated, or seemingly inequitable doctrines
applied." Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 546 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
230. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (balancing risks to the
performance of the President's responsibilities and to the criminal justice system). Prudential
standing rules are "judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction" that
the courts design to promote the core values of separation of powers. Allen v. Wright, 468
u.s. 737. 750-51 (1984).
231 . See also Williams v. Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc .• 520 U.S. 1133, 1133
( 1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling for heightened scrutiny of a lower court decision, based
on concerns about the risk that the court might be trying to "evade the consequences" ofa prior
Supreme Court remand).
232. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 196 ( 1997).
233. See Strauss, Ubiquity, supra note 45, at 208 ("Under any plausible approach to
constitutional interpretation, the courts must be authorized-indeed required-to consider
their own, and the other branches', limitations and propensities when they construct doctrine
to govern future cases.").
234. Fallon, supra note 63, at 66.
235. See Fiss, The Forms ofJustice, supra note 70, at 29 ("To my mind courts exist to
give meaning to our public values, not to resolve disputes.").
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the independence of the judiciary was required
to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of
those ill humors which the arts of designing men, or the influence of
particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people
themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better
information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the
meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and
serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.236
Doubts as to the effectiveness of the structural protections led to the adoption
ofthe Bill ofRights, which the courts enforce. Therefore, judicial enforcement
ofcore values is well grounded in the Constitution. The core rule and its logical
extensions reflect those values, but the prophylactic rule is more expansive.
Does the Constitution's failure explicitly or implicitly to mandate the
prophylactic rule limit the Court's authority to impose the rule?
While Marbury leads naturally to the judicial power to define the rights the
Constitution protects, does the case also justify the judicial creation of
prophylactic rules of constitutional law? The creation of tests inheres in the
definition oflegal norms. ChiefJustice Marshall observed ofthe Constitution:
" [O]nly its great outlines should be marked ... and the minor ingredients which
compose [its important] objects [should] be deduced from the nature of the
objects themselves."237 The test must advance the normative values of the
Constitution, and the prophylactic rule is based on the belief that those values
will not be vindicated by simply reiterating that no state shall deny any person
the equal protection ofthe laws or that no state shall engage in unjustified racial
discrimination. The rule of Carolene Products's note four relies in part on
structural analysis and partly on factual and historical evidence of risk. Those
risks are closely linked to the emerging prophylactic rule, which is designed to
assure practical and not just theoretical protection of rights. Thus, as Paul
Brest observed, Korematsu v. United States 238 declared racial classifications
"suspect" because "our history and traditions provide strong reasons to suspect
that racial classifications ultimately rest on assumptions of the differential
worth of racial groups. " 239
One might argue that Marbury supports only those rules necessary to the
decision of a particular case and does not support the use ofjudicial opinions
as vehicles to establish rules of general applicability. For example, critics of
Roe v. Wade240 maintain that the Court's establishment of the trimester system
exceeds the legitimate judicial role and arrogates to the Court legislative
power. 241 That is also one possible reading of the Court's subsequent rejection
236. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961 ).
237. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819).
238. 323 u.s. 214 (1944).
239. Brest, supra note 124, at 7.
240. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
241 . See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OFTHELAW 114(1990).
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ofthe trimester system in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 242 Still, the Court has
not treated Marbury as a barrier to fashioning prophylactic rules any more than
it has treated the case as a mandate to enforce constitutional rights in all
cases.243 Instead, the Court's tendency (beginning with ChiefJustice Warren's
term of office) to articulate sweeping rules in cases such as Brown II, Miranda,
and Reynolds v. Sims244 also marks the beginning of a period of judicial
expansion of the role of prophylactic rules.245 Former Attorney General
Meese's suggestion that the Court's decisions"[do] not establish a supreme law
of the land that is binding on all persons and parts of government henceforth
and forevermore" 246 would apply equally to all judicial statements of
constitutional rules, whether core or prophylactic. Conversely, the generally
accepted legitimacy of the Court's fashioning of core constitutional rules may
lend support to its fashioning of prophylactic rules as well.
Prophylactic rules perform a utilitarian function by providing guidance to
lower courts and government officials wishing to comply with core rules. If
prophylactic rules may be legislatively replaced with equally effective statutes,
they do not raise the same counter-majoritarian difficulties as decisions that
overturn legislation because of some new-found constitutional value. This
justification applies to prophylactic rules governing executive, judicial, and
state legislative action, but does not authorize rules that supplant Congressional
action.
I have already noted Congress's extensive power to enact prophylactic and
other risk-avoidance legislation, recognized in cases such as Everard's
Breweries/47 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 248 and City of Rome.249 When
Congress's authority to enact this legislation is challenged, the Court applies the
ends-means test of McCulloch to such statutes. If Congress reasonably could
have thought that the prophylactic statute would advance, for example,

242. 505 U.S. 833,872 (1992) (plurality opinion) (O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.)
(treating the trimester system as a prophylactic rule that has not stood the test of time). The
three Justices explained: "The trimester framework [exists] ... to ensure that the woman's
right to choose not become so subordinate to the State's interest in promoting fetal life that her
choice exists in theory but not in fact. We do not agree, however, that the trimester approach
is necessary to accomplish this objective." /d. (plurality opinion).
243. See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms , 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (pointing out that
various doctrines, such as standing, result in some constitutional norms not being fully
enforced). Sager recognizes that valid reasons may sometimes lead to their underenforcement.
244. 377 U.S. 533 (I 964)(rejecting three plans for apportionment of seats in the Alabama
Legislature under the Equal Protection Clause because the apportionment was not on a
population basis and was completely lacking in rationality).
245. See supra Section II.B.
246. Edwin Meese, III, The Law ofthe Constitution, 6 I TUL. L. REv. 979, 983 ( 1987).
247. James Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545 (1924).
248. 383 U.S. 30 I (1966).
249. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
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Fourteenth Amendment rights, the Court will uphold the law as within
Congress's power. Does the theory of McCulloch support judicially imposed
prophylactic rules as well?
The McCulloch Court held that Congress's powers necessarily exceeded
those that the Constitution enumerates, and that Congress "must also be
entrusted with ample means for their execution. " 250 The framers could not,
Chief Justice Marshall insisted, have intended "to clog and embarrass [the
Constitution's] execution by withholding the most appropriate means. " 251
Similarly, "the powers given to the government imply the ordinary means of
execution."252 Congress's enumerated powers are much more extensive than
those of the federal courts. The latter powers are simply to decide cases or
controversies, including those arising under the Constitution. But if
prophylactic rules are an ordinary means of executing the judicial power, the
reasoning of McCulloch supports the courts' authority to fashion and impose
such rules. 253
Thus, one may view implied judicial power to protect rights as a corollary
to implied congressional power to pursue constitutionally enumerated ends.
This does not mean, however, that the Court should be as free in creating
prophylactic rules as in approving congressional prophylactic rules. The Court
upholds prophylactic legislation to enforce section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment so long as the Court is ..able to perceive a basis upon which
Congress might resolve the conflict as it did. " 254 That is not the standard the
Court traditionally has applied to judicially developed prophylactic rules.
There, the Court has required a strong showing ofnecessity. 255
In one area-injunctions-the courts' prophylactic authority is well
established. All injunctions are based on perceived risk, for injunctive relief is
available only for imminent irreparable injury. 256 In every case the court must
decide whether the facts reveal a strong threat of such injury. Douglas Laycock
characterizes a prophylactic injunction as one issued because of "risk of a

250. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 315,408 (1819).
25 I. /d.
252. /d. at 409.
253. Professor Grano argues that McCulloch authorizes "procedural prophylactic rules"
that assist federal courts "in accurately resolving constitutional questions befol'e them," but
not other overprotective prophylactic rules. Grano, Prophylactic Rules, supra note 6, at 145.
Grano would allow federal courts "to promulgate certain rebuttable presumptions in state cases
while denying them the authority to create conclusive presumptions." /d. at 147. Grano
concludes that "prophylactic rules are illegitimate only when employed to relieve federal
courts ofthe task the Constitution has assigned them." /d.
254. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966). Katzenbach thus provides
support for both the Miranda Court's adoption of a judicial prophylactic rule two months later
and its reference to "the power of Congress and the states to develop their own own safeguards
for the privilege." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (I 966).
255. See infra Section 111.8.2.
256. FISS & RENDLEMAN, supra note 69, at 59.
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future violation" but forbidding "conduct that is not itself a violation of
anything." 257 The courts base such an injunction on an ends-means test. David
S. Schoenbrod explains:
The injunction's aim must be the plaintiffs rightful position, but to achieve
that aim, its terms may impose conditions on the defendant that require
actions going beyond the plaintiffs rightful position.... The injunction's
terms, therefore, may have to go beyond the plaintiffs rightful position to
avoid falling short of that position. 258

As Laycock points out, this distinction between the aim and the terms of the
injunction is "readily subject to manipulation," requiring appellate review to test
the closeness of the nexus between the terms and the aim ofthe injunction, as
well as the proportionality of the terms and the aim.259 This problem of " the
indeterminacy of the norms that guide [the] drafting"260 of injunctions exists
with prophylactic rules as well. However, the possibility oflegislative revision
of prophylactic rules ameliorates the difficulty of indeterminate standards.
In Hutto v. Finney, 261 Justice Rehnquist objected that the lower court had
entered an "injunction against a prison practice which has not been shown to
violate the Constitution."262 Rehnquist noted that the injunction's thirty day
limit on punitive isolation "in no way relates to any condition found offensive
to the Constitution. It is, when stripped ofdescriptive verbiage, a prophylactic
rule, doubtless well designed to assure a more humane prison system in
Arkansas, but not complying with" limits on the court's remedial authority. 263
Rehnquist added that " [t]he only ground for the injunction . . . is the
prophylactic one ofassuring that no unconstitutional conduct will occur in the
future."264 However, the opinion of the Court, joined on this point by eight
Justices, dismissively concluded that "taking the long and unhappy history of
the litigation into account, the court was justified in entering a comprehensive

257.
258.

DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 272 (2d ed.1994).
David S. Schoenbrod, The Measure of an Injunction: A Principle to Replace
Balancing the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REv. 627, 678-79 ( 1988).
259. LAYCOCK, supra note 257, at 273.
260. William A . Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and
Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 644 (1982).
261. 437 u.s. 678 (1978).
262. /d. at 710 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This is an overbreadth argument, yet Chief
Justice Rehnquist recently argued for qualified immunity for government officials charged with
motive-based constitutional torts even though, as was "perhaps true," the qualified immunity
rule might "mean that some meritorious claims will go unredressed." Crawford-EI v. Britton,
118 S. Ct. 1584, 1600 (1998) (Rehnquist, C.J ., dissenting). The reason for Rehnquist' s
admittedly overbroad immunity was "that the societal benefit [it] confer[s] outweighs whatever
cost [it] create[s] in terms ofunremedied meritorious claims." /d. at 1601.
263. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 712 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
264. /d. at 714 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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order to insure against the risk ofinadequate compliance." 265 Even Rehnquist
was not absolute in his opposition to prophylactic decrees. Rehnquist noted
that he "reserve[d] judgment on whether such a precautionary order would be
justified where state officials have been shown to have violated previous
remedial orders. " 266
Three years after Miranda, the Court in Carter v. Jury Commission 267
declined to adopt a prophylactic rule designed to counter the risk that the "key
man" system would lead to racial discrimination in the formation of jury
venires.268 The petitioners presented extensive proof that the key man system
had led to racial discrimination in the past because of"its decentralized, highly
discretionary character. " 269 Still, the Court demurred that if the system led to
discrimination, the federal courts could "fashion detailed and stringent
injunctive relief' as a remedy.270 The availability of a prophylactic injunction
thus ruled out what the Court felt was the more intrusive measure offashioning
a general prophylactic rule. 271
Injunctions are based on individuated showings ofthreatened deprivations
ofrights. Prophylactic rules are based on more generalized showings ofthreats
to rights. The Court has occasionally been troubled that some prophylactic
injunctions, especially those that curb expression, "carry greater risks of
censorship and discriminatory application than do general ordinances."272 Do
these injunctions not also carry greater risks than judicially imposed

265. /d. at 687.
266. ld. at 714 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
267. 396 u.s. 320 (1969).
268. ld. at 335-36. The key man system allowed court clerks to use subjective
criteria, such as estimations of integrity and good character, when compiling lists of
eligible jurors.
269. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 182 (1997).
270. Carter, 396 U.S. at 336-37.
271. Randall Kennedy has argued that the Carter Court was wrong, because "(a]t a
certain point, a procedure becomes so subject to corruption and so expensive to monitor that
it should be adjudged incompatible with federal constitutional requirements." KENNEDY,
supra note 269, at 184. Kennedy concluded: "Just as the Court has invalidated overly vague
licensing arrangements that permitted local authorities to indulge their personal whims in
deciding whom to permit to parade, so too should it have invalidated the key-man system."
Jd. (footnotes omitted).
272. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 764 (1994); see also id. at 793
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("(An] injunction ... lends itself ... to the targeted suppression of
particular ideas," is entered by a single judge who may be "chagrined by prior disobedience"
of her order, and is more chilling than a general rule because the injunction's invalidity
provides no defense to contempt prosecutions). Owen M. Fiss convincingly argues that Justice
Scalia has overstated the danger and "overlooks a judge's capacity for impartiality." Owen
M. Fiss, The Unruly Character ofPolitics, 29 MCGEORGE L. REv. 1, I0 ( 1997). Fiss adds
that to treat injunctions as presumptively more suspect than statutes "slights the genuine
advantages to First Amendment values that come from allowing the government to regulate
through injunctions as opposed to criminal statutes." ld.
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prophylactic rules of general applicability? If the federal courts may
legitimately issue prophylactic injunctions with their attendant risks, some
prophylactic rules should carry less risk ofunfairness. 273
Finally, one must reflect on the consequences of denying courts the
authority to create prophylactic rules. Inevitably, the same considerations that
lead courts to fashion prophylactic rules would encourage courts to discover
that the Constitution requires particular rules. One must remember that some
Justices thought Miranda was a rule of constitutional law, not a prophylactic
rule. Ofcourse, the Court might simply abandon some prophylactic rules. The
Court may also transform some prophylactic rules into constitutional
requirements. The change in labels would carry with it severe consequences.
In the name of judicial restraint, this transformation would deprive courts,
Congress, and the states ofthe flexibility that is inherent in judicially fashioned
prophylactic rules.
It is no answer simply to say that the courts should resist the pressure to
safeguard the Constitution. The demise of prophylactic rules would create
something that nature abhors- a vacuum. Had the Court deemed it illegitimate
to fashion prophylactic rules in Miranda, Swann, and New York Times v.
Sullivan, it still would have been faced with the facts reflecting substantial risks
to constitutional rights. Many of the Justices would have imposed rules that
they could more directly link to the Constitution. Rather than adopting a
doctrine that invites strained expansion of constitutional rules, it seems far
preferable to fashion principles for the creation of prophylactic rules. Of
course, one must take into account both the generic shortcomings of
prophylactic rules and the legitimate need to safeguard the Constitution. The
courts should not be placed in the position where "any judicial decision granting
rights would be nothing more than markings on a piece ofpaper." 274

B. Principles Governing the Creation ofProphylactic Rules
Despite the scholarly debate over the legitimacy of judicially created
prophylactic measures in constitutional law, the Supreme Court has not
developed a set of explicit principles to govern them. The Court's discussion
of prophylactic rules has consisted of rumblings in dissents, stray off-hand
references, and random comments in opinions. Nonetheless, one may extract
guiding principles from two sources. One may look to the underlying
justifications, described above, for devising such rules, and one may look to the
cases in which the Court either adopted or rejected prophylactic measures.
These sources suggest the following conclusions.

273 . On the other hand, in Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 ( 1997), the Court preferred
individuated treatment of the risks that subjecting a sitting president to a civil suit for prepresidential conduct entailed.
274. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 83, at 281.
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1. Protection of a Clear Constitutional Right
The first prerequisite for creating a prophylactic rule is to design the rule
to protect a clear constitutional right. For example, while endorsing Congress's
power to adopt prophylactic rules in City of Boerne v. Flores, 275 the Court
disapproved the Religious Freedom Restoration Act because "Congress does
not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is."276 If such a
limit confines Congress's power, a fortiori, it also confines the Court's power
to fashion prophylactic rules. One must distinguish the prophylactic rule from
the desired end state. The analysis begins with a clear understanding ofthe end
sought: what is the precise constitutional right to be protected? Dean Gerald
M. Caplan criticizes Miranda as promoting assertion of the privilege against
self-incrimination rather than protecting the suspect from unconstitutional
coercion. 277 Since a suspect may waive the privilege, the rule is not designed
to protect a clear constitutional right. However, the Court viewed the case
differently, treating the Miranda warnings as necessary to guard against
coercion. 278
A corollary follows from the precept that prophylactic rules must protect
constitutional rights: The legitimacy ofproposed prophylactic rules diminishes
as the distance from constitutional rights grows. This concept helps explain the
many cases that fashion exceptions to Miranda or decline to extend the rule of
the case.279 Courts disfavor prophylactic rules to safeguard prophylactic rules
because they are too remote from the original right the rule protects.

275. 521 U.S. 507 ( 1997). "Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations
can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits
conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative spheres of autonomy
previously reserved to the states."' ld at 518 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,455
(1976)).
276. ld
277. Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REv. 141 7, 1447 (1985).
Justice Scalia has questioned the extension of Miranda on similar grounds. In Minnick v.
Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990), Scalia's dissent argued that the Court had "gone far beyond
any genuine concern about suspects who do not know their right to remain silent, or who have
been coerced to abandon it." /d. at 166 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia also complained that
not allowing the police to reinitiate questioning after the suspect has consulted an attorney "is
the latest stage of prophylaxis built upon prophylaxis." ld (Scalia, J., dissenting).
278. "(W]e hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the
privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478
( 1966). Myron Moskovitz argues that the policy against coercion is not a clear constitutional
right, and that Miranda responded to the doctrinal uncertainties of prior decisions by
formulating a bright-line rule. See MYRON MOSKOVITZ, CASES & PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: THE POLICE 440-43 (2d ed. 1998).
279. See Grano, Prophylactic Rules, supra note 6, at 110-11.
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2. Evidence ofNeed
A prophylactic rule should be based on evidence ofneed. To borrow from
another area of the law in which risk is relevant, the issue becomes the gravity,
immediacy, and probability of the feared deprivation of rights: "'In each case
[courts] must ask whether the gravity of the "evil," discounted by its
improbability,justifies such invasion offree speech as is necessary to avoid the
danger. "'280 The evidence needed to support a prophylactic rule differs from the
grounds required for a prophylactic injunction. The rule must respond to
evidence ofa widespread need, while the injunction relies on individuated facts.
For example, the Court's rejection of the prophylactic rule proposed in Ohio v.
Robinette281 may be explained in part by the local (and therefore individuated)
nature of the evidence supporting it. 282 Similarly, the Court's reversal of
Aguilar v. Felton283 and the prophylactic rule against use of public school
employees in parochial schools stems from Aguilar's speculative presumption
ofrisk. 284
One may object that assessment of need contains a normative element.
Indeed, today's Court is quick to see a risk that affirmative action programs
improperly discriminate, but has abandoned suspicion ofstate laws governing
abortion.285 One cure would be to return to the thorough assessment of need

280. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,510 (1951) (quoting United States v. Dennis,
183 F.2d 201,212 (1950) (Hand, C.J.)).
281. 519 u.s. 33 (1997).
282. The Court reversed the Ohio Supreme Court's fashioning of a prophylactic rule to
govern searches during traffic stops. As Justice Ginsburg's concurrence explained, the Ohio
court had found "that traffic stops in the State were regularly giving way to contraband
searches, characterized as consensual, even when officers had no reason to suspect illegal
activity." ld at 40 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). The Ohio court had established "a bright-line
prerequisite for consensual interrogation under these circumstances," requiring the officer
making the stop to advise a lawfully seized defendant that "he is 'free to go' before his consent
to search will be recognized as voluntary." ld at 35 (Rehnquist, C.J.). The Supreme Court
rejected this prophylactic rule, because "we have consistently eschewed bright-line rules,
instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry" under the Fourth
Amendment. ld at 38. The factual predicate consisted of individuated information about
Ohio, so this may account for the Court's summary rejection of the state court's rationale for
imposing the rule.
283. 437 u.s. 502 (1985).
284. See infra notes 326-29 and accompanying text
285. For example, in Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997), the Court upheld a
district court ruling that denied a motion for preliminary injunction against enforcement of
Montana's statute forbidding physician assistants to perform abortions. !d. at 976. The Ninth
Circuit held that the district court had erred in failing to hold that the plaintiffs had shown a
fairchance ofsuccess on the merits. Armstrong v. Mazurek, 94 F.3d 566,568 (9th Cir. 1996).
The Ninth Circuit thought that the district court had failed to consider "the totality of
circumstances surrounding the enactment of Chapter 321 , and whether that statute in fact can
be regarded as serving a legitimate health function." ld at 567 (citing Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S.
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that the Miranda Court employed. But, as Justice Cardozo observed, judges
can never completely extirpate their own normative approach from their
judging. 286
The usual fact scenario demonstrating need begins when the Court defines
some core constitutional right, such as the freedom from official compulsion to
confess, the freedom from state-imposed racial segregation, the freedom from
specified conditions of confinement in prison, the freedom of speech, or the
freedom of a woman to choose to have an abortion. The evidence of need
normally consists ofa pattern ofofficial violations ofthe right, like the patterns
described in Miranda, Swann, Hutto, and Madsen. Conversely, the absence of
any clear pattern of official violations led to the result in Agostini.
3. Proportionality
How does the proposed prophylactic rule protect the right? Is the rule more
intrusive than necessary?287 The Court recently articulated the need for

899,901-06 (1996), and Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995), two Supreme Court
decisions regarding race-based congressional districts). The Supreme Court responded that
"since the record does not support a conclusion that 'the legislature's predominant motive' .
. . was to create a 'substantial obstacle' to abortion, it is quite unnecessary to address ' whether
the Court ofAppeals misread this Court's opinions"' in those cases. Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 974
n.2 (citations omitted); cf Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 ( 1971) ("It is difficult or
impossible for any court to determine the 'sole' or 'dominant' motivation behind the choices
of a group of legislators."). The Supreme Court, however, pointed to the Ninth Circuit's
failure to identifY evidence of improper legislative purpose. The Court took the unusual step
ofgranting certiorari and reversing and remanding the case even though no final judgment had
yet been entered. The Court justified this with the Ninth Circuit's clear error and the "real
threat" that similar statutes in several Ninth Circuit states would be placed under preliminary
injunctions against enforcement. Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 974. The Court apparently believed
that the risk of erroneously enjoining the enforcement of state statutes outweighed the risk of
unduly burdening the right to an abortion.
286. "There is in each of us a stream of tendency ... which gives coherence and direction
to thought and action .... [Judges] may try to see things as objectively as we please. None the
less, we can never see them with any eyes except our own." BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 12-13 (1921) (footnote omitted). A later (and less
restrained) observer opined:
The idea that a human being, by a conscious act of will, can rid his mind of the
preferences and prejudices and political slants or values that his whole past life has
accumulated in him, and so manage to think in the rarefied atmosphere of simon-pure
objectivity, is simply a psychological absurdity.
FRED RODELL, NINE MEN 29-30 ( 1955).
287. Peter M. Shane's comments frame one argument against over-intrusiveness:
I believe the most plausible stance for a "rule of law" judge is this: the judge should feel
obligated to intervene as much as, but no more than, is necessary to create a justifiable
confidence that the defendant institution will, henceforth, be responsive to the plaintiff's
claims of right. That is, the judge should regard plaintiffs as entitled to a fair expectation
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"proportionality" in prophylactic legislation,288 and it previously made a similar
point as to injunctive relief.289 It follows that the same restriction applies to
judicially imposed prophylactic rules. The legitimacy of a prophylactic rule
flows from finding a risk to a core right. The problem is that there may be
many possible ways to guard against that risk. The Miranda warnings could
have used different verbal formulations, or might be supplanted by the taping
of suspect interviews. The issues of New York Times v. Sullivan might have
been resolved by limits on damages awards in defamation cases. Within this
range ofchoice in devising prophylactic rules, the courts' actions most resemble
legislation, and the counter-majoritarian concern takes on its greatest
legitimacy. Similarly, a prophylactic rule compatible with the desired end state
seems preferable to one that is not. Perhaps prophylactic rules that are
incompatible with the desired end state require a higher standard of
justification. But a showing of necessity may justify even such incompatible
rules. For example, the Court has never repudiated Justice Blackmun's
aphorism in Regents ofUniversity ofCalifornia v. Bakke290 that "to get beyond
racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way."291
Prophylactic rules of constitutional law depend on the rulemaker's
conclusion that the rule's absence creates a risk of noncompliance with the
Constitution. Since the very existence ofa rule in the Constitution creates some
risk of noncompliance, risk as the only justification would authorize a
seemingly unlimited class of prophylactic rules. The Court has implicitly
recognized that possibility and has tended to base its approval or imposition of
prophylactic rules on the substantial support oflegislative or adjudicative facts.
The Miranda Court dwelt on past cases and studies showing police abuses.
The Batson Court turned its back on Swain v. Alabamcl-92 because intervening
years had revealed patterns of racial discrimination in peremptory challenges.
The Swann Court referred to past failures to desegregate as justifying
imposition of"criteria ofsufficient specificity" to ensure future compliance.293
The City ofRome Court relied on the substantial showing ofrisk that Congress
had developed before fashioning and extending the Voting Rights Act. 294 The

that their interests will be seriously and sympathetically weighed by the defendant
institution in the context of future decisions.
Peter M. Shane, Rights, Remedies and Restraint, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 531, 565-66 ( 1988).
288. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
289. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 402 U.S. I (1971).
290. 438 u.s. 265 (1978).
291. !d. at 407.
292. 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (upholding the conviction of an African-American defendant
by an all-white jury from which the district attorney had stricken six African-American venire
members). The Court rejected the argument that "a showing that there are qualified Negroes
and that none have served makes out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination on the
part of the State." /d. at 226.
293. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 402 U.S. I, 26 (1971).
294. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 214 ( 1980).
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record in the case arguably contradicted that showing, but there were some facts
suggesting risk. 295 If so, City of Rome would stand for the proposition that
prophylactic measures are permissible even if over-inclusive. Justice
Rehnquist, dissenting in City ofRome, would require greater evidence ofrisk. 296
Although it is not possible to specify the precise quantum of risk that would
justify a prophylactic rule, surely the words of Justice Frankfurter, written in
a somewhat different context, apply here: "The process of Constitutional
adjudication does not thrive on conjuring up horrible possibilities that never
happen in the real world and devising doctrines sufficiently comprehensive in
detail to cover the remotest contingency."297
4. Impact on Other Branches and Levels of Government
What is the impact of the prophylactic rule on other branches or levels of
government? Many post-Miranda cases stress the value of a bright-line rule
that provides '"clear and unequivocal' guidelines to the law enforcement
profession."298 The Court explained: "This gain in specificity, which benefits
the accused and the State alike, has been thought to outweigh the burdens that
the decision in Miranda imposes on law enforcement agencies and the
courts. "299 On the other hand, every prophylactic rule fetters the freedom ofthe
states or Congress to act. Whether the adverse impact is "too much"
inescapably brings normative values back into judicial judgment. Although the
Rehnquist Court has generally been highly supportive of state autonomy, the
Court drew no distinction between state and federal courts when it fashioned
and applied prophylactic injunctions aimed at abortion clinic protesters. 300 To
Justice Scalia, partially dissenting, the dangers of a content-basedjudicial order
made the facially neutral state court injunction "at least as deserving of strict
scrutiny as a statutory, content-based restriction."301
5. Other Factors
Risk is often accompanied by counter-risk. For example, the risk of
overenforcement mirrors the risk of underenforcement. The risk of

295. !d.
296. !d. at 219 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
297. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583 (1946) (plurality opinion).
298. See, e.g., Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682 (1988).
299. !d. In his dissent, Justice Kennedy,joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, did not claim
that prophylactic rules are improper. Rather, he argued that "the majority does not have a
convincing case" that the rule was "consistent with the practical realities of suspects' rights
and police investigations." !d. at 688 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
300. See generally Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 ( 1997) (rule applied
to federal court injunction); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (rule
applied to state court injunction).
301. Madsen, 521 U.S. at 792.
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discrimination against African-Americans is theoretically matched by the risk
of discrimination against other groups, such as whites. Seldom, if ever, does
the law attain an ideal balance, where measures directed at one risk do not
accentuate another. The law's fallibility, however, is not a sufficient ground for
failing to address risk. Rather, this fallibility cautions us to weigh the risks and
the probable consequences ofprophylactic measures. As Justice Kennedy has
argued, "[b]alance is essential when the Court fashions rules which are
preventative and do not themselves stem from violations of a constitutional
right."302 For example, the history of race in America, coupled with the current
relative positions of the races, suggests that the practical risk to society from
racial discrimination against African-Americans far outweighs any theoretical
risk of discrimination against white persons.303
Prophylactic rules are over-inclusive because they require conduct that goes
beyond what is strictly necessary to achieve their underlying objectives. The
rule against prior restraints treats the risk of violating the freedom of speech as
a concern that normally outweighs counter-risks. Because the consequences of
speech are usually speculative, the state ordinarily may not forbid particular
speech simply because it fears adverse consequences. Justice Brennan,
concurring in New York Times Co. v. United States,304 wrote that "the First
Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior judicial restraints of the press
predicated upon surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences may
result."305 In the same case, Justice Stewart disapproved a prior restraint for
lack of a showing that publication would "surely result in direct, immediate,
and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people."306
Risk is heightened by rules that tum on legislative intent. Washington v.
Davis307 requires a party attacking a facially neutral law as racially
discriminatory to prove that the legislature adopted the law with discriminatory
intent.308 The difficulties ofthe rule are well known; legislators may mask their
invidious intent behind neutral justifications, they may harbor unconscious
invidious intent, and some legislators may act on discriminatory intent while
others act from benign motives. The risk oflegislation based on discriminatory
intent may be sufficiently troublesome to warrant prophylactic protections. The
Court has fashioned prophylactic measures when innocent reasons seemed
unlikely or where it believed risk ofimproper motives was "heightened."309 Yet,

302. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 691 (1988) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
303. This is a point Justice Kennedy has not yet made.
304. 403 u.s. 713 (1971).
305. ld at 725 (Brennan, J., concurring).
306. /d. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
307. 426 u.s. 229 (1976).
308. ld at 242.
309. E.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992)
("[R)egulations that leave the owner of land without economically beneficial or productive
options for its use ... carry with them a heightened risk that private property is being pressed
into some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm."). Justice
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the Court has more often followed the rule of Washington v. Davis, which the
Court adopted in order to avoid the counter-risk that requiring the government
to justify the disparate impact offacially neutral statutes "would be far reaching
and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range
oftax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes." 310 Even in
the face ofa statistical study that ruled out nonracial explanations for disparate
imposition of the death penalty, the Court declined to find "a constitutionally
significant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital sentencing
process."311 Conversely, the Court has adopted a prophylactic rule to guard
against jury bias at the sentencing phase of a capital case. In Turner v.
Murray, 312 the Court held that the risk of racial prejudice infecting .the jury in

Blackmun objected that the Court had issued "sweeping new rules to decide such a narrow
case." /d. at I 036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens agreed "that the risks of such
singling out are of central concern in takings law," but argued that "such risks do not justify
a per se rule for total regulatory takings" because a regulation "may deprive [a property owner]
of all of his property without singling him out." /d. at I 067 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
310. Davis, 426 U.S. at 248.
311. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987). The apparent problem in
McCleskey was the inability to identify the discriminatory state actor. The Court noted: "Even
a sophisticated multiple-regression analysis such as [the study in evidence] can only
demonstrate a risk that the factor of race entered into some capital sentencing decisions and
a necessarily lesser risk that race entered into any particular sentencing dec ision." Id. at 291
n.7. Of course, the Court could have concluded in Miranda that failure to give the Miranda
warning could only demonstrate a risk that some confessions were involuntary and a lesser risk
that coercion led to any particular confession. The difference between the two cases may lie
in the ease of fashioning a prophylactic remedy in Miranda without sacrificing criminal law
enforcement and the difficulty of fashioning prophylactic relief in McCleskey without simply
invalidating the death penalty. Perhaps the difference is that the McCleskey Court examined
the statistical evidence of risk not as possibly requiring a prophylactic rule, but as claimed
proof of a constitutional violation. Cf Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1975) (plurality
opinion) (creating a prophylactic rule to ensure that "discretion must be suitably directed and
limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.").
The core constitutional rule flowing from the Eighth Amendment forbids arbitrary and
capricious death sentences. Gregg held that the Georgia procedures adequately guarded
against that risk; in so holding, the Court defined the prophylactic measures that one must
take. The McCleskey Court believed that Gregg and cases like Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 ( 1986), had reached the limits ofjudicial ability to fashion appropriate rules to minimize
the risk that racial prejudice would play a role in death penalty cases. The Court rejected
Justice Stevens's suggestion that narrowing the class of death-eligible defendants would
ameliorate the risk of racial discrimination as "speculative." McCleskey, 48 1 U.S. at 31 9 n.45 .
The Court also was concerned that "there is no limiting principle to the type of challenge
brought by McCleskey." /d.; cf Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 716 ( 1984)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The importance to the process of counsel's efforts, combined with
the severity and irrevocability of the sanction at stake, require that the standards for
determining what constitutes 'effective assistance ' be applied especially stringently in capital
sentencing proceedings.").
312. 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
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an interracial crime "entitled [a capital defendant] to have prospective jurors
informed ofthe race of the victim and questioned on the issue ofracial bias." 313
Where the rule is not facially neutral, but is explicitly based on race, however,
the risk of invidious discrimination becomes intolerable and any counter-risk
becomes minimal. The legislature no longer carries a presumption of
fairness, and the risk that the rule is invidious leads to the application of strict
scrutiny.
Predictive judgments may rest on intuitive sense, on pure speculation, on
a solid factual record, on judicial notice of how the world works, or on some
combination of these bases. The Court sometimes, as in Miranda, explains its
factual predicate at length. In the First Amendment context, the Court
sometimes speculates on the "chilling effect" of a rule, as in New York Times
v. Sullivan. In Wisconsin v. Mitchel/, 314 the Court found the argument that
enhanced sentences for race-based crimes would have a chilling effect on speech
"too speculative a hypothesis."315 The Court characterized the purported chill
as "far more attenuated and unlikely than that contemplated in traditional
'overbreadth' cases. " 316 Yet, in Cohen v. California, 317 the Court rejected "the
facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a
substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process."318 "Indeed," the Court
continued, "governments might soon seize upon the censorship of particular
words as a convenient guise for banning the expression ofunpopular views. "319
The search for a general theory of prophylactic rules must recognize that
the rules are not all alike. Some prophylactic measures come closer to being
core constitutional rules. There is a substantial difference between the
exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio and the exclusionary rule of Miranda.
Mapp excludes unconstitutionally obtained evidence, while Miranda
excludes statements obtained absent the requisite warning, even when there has
been no violation ofthe Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
It is more plausible that Mapp's exclusionary rule is required by the
Constitution than that the mandate of Miranda is. 320
An argument in favor of Miranda could focus on the Court's power to set
evidentiary standards in constitutional cases. Surely, the Court could have
announced that it would presume that statements given after a Miranda warning
were voluntary. Conversely, the Court legitimately could have decided that
statements given without a warning are presumptively coerced because it is so
313. /d. at 36-37.
314. 508U.S.476(1993).
315. /d. at 489.
316. /d. at 488.
317. 403 u.s. 15 (1971).
318. /d. at 26.
319. /d.
320. See generally Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Up from Calandra: The
Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REv. 251 (1974) (arguing
that Mapp is a rule of constitutional, rather than "subconstitutional," law).
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obviously against the interests of a suspect to talk to the police in a secret
interrogation. Swann represents yet another scenario, in which a prophylactic
rule of evidence blended with a reparative rule rooted in the equal protection
clause-that the Constitution required the states to disestablish racially dual
school systems.
What all three cases share is their adoption of a rule the Court directs at
risk to a core right. In each case the Court thought that some rule should exist
to safeguard the right. A variety of rules might do the job, but if the Court has
the authority to safeguard the right, it must have the authority to choose an
effective rule. The primary issue becomes what prophylactic rule the Court
should adopt, thus placing on the Court the arguably legislative function ofrule
formulation and selection. However, the Court traditionally has fashioned rules
in many contexts. Here the context is the judicial function of enforcing core
rules enforcement. An ali-or-nothing bright-line rule validating or invalidating
judicially imposed prophylactic rules is inappropriate. The Court must evaluate
each prophylactic rule separately.
In the end, the judicial fashioning and imposition of prophylactic rules
should be guided by sensitivity to a congeries of factors that often compete.
How compelling is the evidence ofrisk? What is the nature of the risk? What
counter-risks are raised by imposition ofthe prophylactic rule? On what values
does the prophylactic rule impinge-state autonomy, separation ofpowers, or
lower court discretion? Is the Court competent to fashion a workable rule that
bears a close link to the constitutional right being protected? Are the
consequences of the rule predictable?

C. Modifying or Terminating Prophylactic Rules
1. Judicial Modification or Termination
As with any rule, the Supreme Court's adoption of a prophylactic rule does
not forever preclude the Court from considering the rule's wisdom or
appropriateness. Lower courts are bound by the rule, but the high Court is free
to modify or terminate the prophylactic measure. Indeed, the nature of
prophylactic rules may suggest how to approach stare decisis and the
modification or termination of case law precedent. The most obvious reason
to change the prophylactic rule is if a change has occurred in the content of the
core rule it is protecting. Beyond that, the features of prophylactic rules that
bear most directly on the modification issue are the perils of prediction,321 the
relative efficacy of the rule, and the impact of the rule on other values.
Risks may change over time. A prediction founded on prevailing social

321. The phrase "perils of prediction" is a chapter heading in FISS & RENDLEMAN, supra
note 69, at I 09. See also OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 80 ( 1978) (discussing
"the difficulty of prophesying").
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attitudes becomes unreliable as those attitudes evolve.322 For example, the
Court seems to believe that a long period of compliance with school
desegregation orders attenuates the risk of perpetuating the effects of past
discrimination. 323 Changes in technology and police practices could alter the
risks that Miranda addressed. Would videotaping all interrogations minimize
the risk of coercion?324 Although the answer to that question may be unclear
at present, an affirmative answer could lead the Court to re-evaluate
Miranda.325
If the original prophylactic rule was based on assumptions rather than
evidence of risk, changed assumptions may lead to abandonment of the rule.
This is essentially the scenario that led the Court to overrule Aguilar v.
Felton, 326 a case that generally forbade the use of public school teachers to
educate low income children in parochial schools. Aguilar relied on a
groundless assumption that the danger that such use would advance religion
would lead to excessive entanglement because ofthe need to monitor the public
school teachers. 327 Twelve years later the Court overturned this prophylactic
ruling in Agostini v. Felton,328 holding that there was no reason to assume that
the teachers would advance religion; hence, there was no reason to fear the
threatened entanglement. 329
A prophylactic rule could prove ineffectual or much more costly than
predicted, especially as compared with other potential rules designed to guard
against deprivation of rights. Moreover, empirical evidence could undermine
the initial finding of risk. For example, the argument has been made (and
persuasively rebutted) that evidence reveals both that coerced confessions are
less prevalent than the Miranda Court thought and that Miranda has proven

322. Discussing Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993), Akhil Reed Amar suggests
that "[i]fthe facts change over time--if, say, police are now generally more sensitive to Fourth
Amendment issues than they were in 1961-a legislature is free without embarrassment to
change the law." AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE !51
(1997).
323. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,496 (1992).
324. See William A. Geller, Videotaping Interrogations and Confessions, in THE
MIRANDA DEBATE 303 (Richard A. Leo & George C. Thomas III eds., 1998).
325. Paul G. Cassell argues: "Videotaping interrogations would certainly be as effective
as Miranda in preventing police coercion and probably more so." Paul G . Cassell, Miranda 's
Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 387, 487 (1996). Stephen J.
Schulhofer's rebuttal to Cassell's article does not quarrel with the possible utility of
videotapes, but instead suggests that states may be free to adopt that method as a supplement
to the Miranda rule. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda 's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits
and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 501, 556 (1996).
326. 473 u.s. 402 (1985).
327. /d. at 409.
328. 521 u.s. 203 (1997).
329. /d.
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much more costly than initially predicted. 330
2. Congressional Modification or Termination
Congress's power to change its own prophylactic legislation, such as the
Voting Rights Act, seems beyond challenge. Congress's power to enforce the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution should
include the limited authority to change judicially adopted prophylactic rules.
Congress's powers under Article I, section 8 may also authorize the legislature
to change judicially adopted prophylactic rules. However, the authority to
legislate on a subject remains limited by the constitutional protection ofrights.
The extent ofCongress's revisionary power is determined by the hybrid nature
ofjudicially adopted prophylactic rules. While Congress lacks authority to add
to or to detract from the core constitutional rights/31 the Miranda decision
emphasized: "Congress and the States are free to develop their own safeguards
for the privilege, so long as they are fully as effective as [the Miranda
procedures] in informing accused persons of their right of silence and in
affording a continuous opportunity to exercise it. " 332 The Court did not say that
the Miranda procedures could be replaced by procedures that failed either to
inform the accused ofthe right of silence or to afford a continuous opportunity
to exercise it. But if the Miranda procedures are prophylactic, rather than a
constitutional right, Congress and the states arguably possess the power to
replace them with any procedure that effectively protects the core right of
silence. As Walter Dellinger argued in a related context, Congress's
revisionary power depends "upon the relationship of the remedy created to its
substantive constitutional predicate. " 333
The Miranda Court had, of course, rejected case-by-case determinations
of voluntariness as ineffective protections of the Fifth Amendment. 334
Nonetheless, Congress adopted 18 U.S.C. § 3501, a post-Miranda statute
governing federal criminal trials. The statute purports to return the law to its
pre-Miranda status by excluding a confession only if the court determines the
statement was involuntary. 335 Two courts have ruled that since Miranda is a
prophylactic measure, Congress has unlimited power to change it and therefore
§ 3 501 is constitutional. 336 Congress does have the power to change judicially

330.

Cassell, supra note 325, at 476-78,484. But see generally Schulhofer, supra note

55.
331. SeeCityofBoeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641,651 n.IO(I966).
332. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,490 (1966).
333. Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1547 (1972).
334. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477.
335. 18 u.s.c. § 3501 (1994).
336. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted in part, 120
S. Ct. 578 (1999); United States v. Rivas-Lopez, 988 F. Supp. 1424 (D. Utah 1997).
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adopted prophylactic rules, but that power is limited.
Congress's revisionary power derives in most cases from the
enforcement clauses of the Reconstruction Amendments and should be based
on criteria similar to those that govern judicial revision. Since§ 3501 affects
only federal criminal trials, Congress's power to enact the statute must rest on
some other basis, such as the Article III power to "constitute tribunals inferior
to the Supreme Court,"337 the spending power,338 or the Necessary and Proper
Clause 339 coupled with the Fifth Amendment. However, Congress's power
under these provisions is not unlimited. Both the legislative and judicial
branches derive their prophylactic power from the constitutional mandate to
enforce rights that the Constitution creates. Because those criteria rely
primarily on legislative facts regarding risk, cost, and relative effectiveness,
Congress may employ its superior ability to investigate and find legislative facts
regarding those criteria. 340 But any change in the judicial rule should afford
"comparable vindication ofthe constitutional provision involved."341 That is,
if Congress should so find and the Court should uphold the finding, Congress's
revision should be upheld. 342 Prophylactic rules are not, as the courts upholding
§ 3501 imply, based on mere "supervisory" powers. Prophylactic measures
find their origin in the courts' duty to enforce the Constitution and in judicial
determinations of seriously threatened deprivations ofconstitutional rights. The
difficult issue, which the lower courts ignored, is whether Congress's action is
based on proper findings that the legislative standard sufficiently safeguards the

337. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 9; see also id. art. III,§ I (granting Congress the power
to ordain and establish inferior courts).
338. /d. art. I, § 8, cl. I.
339. /d. cl. 18.
340. In The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. I (1985),
Thomas W. Merrill makes a similar point, though he does not discuss the special
characteristics of prophylactic rules. Following Monaghan, Professor Merrill classifies cases
like Miranda as constitutional common law that
cannot be overturned by mere congressional disapproval. The federal judiciary, not
Congress, is the ultimate interpreter of the specific intentions of the framers of the
Constitution and thus has the final say in determining what policies are reflected in that
document. Nevertheless, congressional override should be permissible when Congress
enacts a statute that affords an adequate substitute for the constitutional common law
rule. Since necessity is the foundation of preemptive lawmaking, the disappearance of
necessity eliminates the foundation for the rule. Thus, Congress may override preemptive
lawmaking based on the Constitution, but only if the federal courts independently
conclude that Congress has enacted a statute that provides roughly the same degree of
protection for constitutional policies as the federal common law rule.
/d. at 57-58.
341. Dellinger, supra note 333, at 1548. Similarly, Professor Schulhofer argues that
Withrow shows the "constitutional grounding of the 'prophylactic' rules." Schulhofer, supra
note 325, at 554. Schulhofer concludes that those rules "cannot simply be abrogated. They
can be replaced only by other rules, likewise 'prophylactic."' /d. at 555.
342. Dellinger, supra note 333, at 1549.
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rights that are otherwise at risk. To decide that issue, the courts must also
determine the proper standard of judicial review to apply to congressional
findings. 343
IV. CONCLUSION
The Constitution contains no explicit repetition of either the mandate to
"safeguard my charge" or the prohibition "you must not add anything to it, nor
take anything away from it. " 344 Are prophylactic rules sometimes required to
safeguard the Constitution? Do prophylactic rules improperly add to the
Constitution by violating the early judicial inference that the federal
government's powers are limited to those which the Constitution enumerates?
Doubtless, the debate over the legitimacy ofjudicially created prophylactic
rules will continue. The controversy has been cast as a debate between
formalism and values-oriented interpretation. The discussion is more than that.
A more complete list includes not only formalism and values but also a
particular view of structural concerns-both federalism and separation of
powers-and pragmatism. Moreover, each school of thought provides some
support to each side of the debate.
While formalists may point out that the Constitution contains no explicit
authorization of judicial prophylactic rules, neither does the Constitution
explicitly bar such rules. While prophylactic rules do impinge on state
prerogatives, they do so in furtherance of constitutional restrictions on state
action. While the Court is engaging in rule-making, Congress is free to alter
prophylactic rules so long as the legislature properly addresses risks to
constitutional rights. Certain values may support safeguarding constitutional
rights, but they also warn againstjudicial tyranny. Pragmatically, prophylactic
rules may be necessary to ensure the observance of constitutional rights, but the
Court's ability to predict risk and to fashion workable rules of general
application may often be inferior to that of Congress or the states.
AU of these factors enter into the modem cases. The Rehnquist Court has
preserved prophylactic rule making, but has recognized limitations on the process.
The Court has never developed an open and self-conscious set of principles
governing the creation, content, revision, or retraction of judicially created
prophylactic rules. Yet, once we recognize the competing constitutional considerations, we will possess the tools that will enable us to create these principles.

343. Congress made no such findings when adopting 18 U.S.C. § 3501. See generally
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197
( 1968). The Senate Judiciary Committee report questioned the need for the Miranda rule, but
did not present factual information or findings regarding the efficacy of the procedures in
§ 3501. See generally S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112.
344. See Leviticus 18:30 (Tanach, Mesorah Publ. 1996); Deuteronomy 12:32 (New
English Bible 1970); see also supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.

